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I Didn't Ask to Be Born: The American
Law of Disinheritance and a Proposal
for Change to a System of Protected
Inheritancet
by
DEBORAH A. BATTs*
The sanctity and inviolability of the parent-child bond is a funda-
mental concept imbedded in America's social and legal structure.1 An
integral-part of that bond has been the parental obligation to nurture,
support, educate, and provide for the child, at least during the life of the
parent. As sacred and fundamental as the bond may be, however, it is
consistently abandoned whenever it clashes with another fundamental
concept imbedded in America's social and legal structure: testamentary
freedom.
A review of the current law in America makes clear that when it
comes to mhentance, 2 American children are in need of a champion.
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spective for this Article. Finally, the author wishes to thank Paul Solomon and Magda Vives,
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1. Of course, the sanctity of the parent-child bond is not unique to American society.
While it vaned from society to society, that bond is more ancient than civilization itself. See,
e.g., H. MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 132-33, 136, 162 (1970).
Until recently, societal attempts at intervention to protect the child from the parent have
been hampered by governmental reluctance to interfere in the parent-child relationship, even
to benefit the child. See, eg., Hafen, The Family as an Entity, 22 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 865,
868-89 (1989).
2. Inheritance is defined as "[tihat which is inherited or to be inherited. Property which
descends to heir on the intestate death of another. An estate or property which a man has by
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Many countries today protect children from disinheritance by will
through either a forced share system-an automatic process by which a
set portion of each parent's estate is reserved for their children-or a
family maintenance system-a discretionary judicial process that can
provide for the needs of a child by overriding a parent's will upon a
showing of just cause. In America, however, a parent can disinherit a
child without giving any reason. Until 1989, Louisiana was the only
American jurisdiction to protect children of the deceased, regardless of
age or need, against disinheritance by will. In July 1989, however, even
Louisiana essentially abolished these legal protections for adult children. 3
When contrasted with the protections for children found in the laws
of intestacy, this lack of protection for children whose parents have exe-
cuted wills becomes even more difficult to understand. The laws of intes-
tacy dictate how the decedent's assets are to be distributed in the absence
of a will: first, among the surviving spouse and children of the decedent,
then among other relatives. In these circumstances, statutes prescribe
the shares of the decedent's property to which the various relatives have
a recognized claim, reflecting society's sense of what should be done.
The decedent's will is the mechanism that provides the decedent
with the testamentary freedom to control from the grave the disposition
of property amassed during life. Even though we have come to recognize
that "you can't take it with you," the law of wills has developed as the
next best thing. Courts often strain to divine the intent of the deceased in
order to fulfill the decedent's wishes, as set forth in the will.4
This American indifference to the disinheritance of children, who
indeed did not ask to be born, is irreconcilable with protections provided
disinherited surviving spouses. When the surviving spouse has been writ-
ten out of the deceased spouse's will, or has been devised inadequate as-
sets, many American jurisdictions provide the surviving spouse with a
remedy known as the elective share.5 In the majority of jurisdictions that
descent, as heir to another, or which he may transmit to another, as his heir." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 704 (5th ed. 1979).
3. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. arts. 1493-1496 (West 1989) (as amended July 10, 1989, effec-
tive July 1, 1990, limits the protection of forced heirship to children 23 years of age and under;
prior to 1989, there was no upper age limit for protection of children). See, e.g., Haskell, The
Power of Disinheritance: Proposal For Reform, 52 GEO. L.J. 499, 506 (1964); Laufer, Flexible
Restraints on Testamentary Freedom-A Report on Decedents' Family Maintenance Legisla-
tion, 69 HARV. L. REV. 277, 308 (1955).
4. See, e.g., Matter of Carmer, 71 N.Y.2d 781, 785, 525 N.E.2d 734, 735-36, 530
N.Y.S.2d 88, 89-90 (1988); Matter of Walker, 64 N.Y.2d 354, 357-58, 476 N.E.2d 298, 300,
486 N.Y.S.2d 899, 901 (1985).
5. See infra note 291 and accompanying text.
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have this remedy, the surviving spouse may receive as much as one-third
or one-half of the estate.6
One justification for this clear derogation of the intent of the de-
ceased spouse is the overriding state concern that the surviving spouse
does not become a ward of the state.7 Another justification is recognition
of the surviving spouse's contributions to the estate,8 which is analogous
to the economic partnership of marriage theory.9 While direct financial
contributions of children to the acquisition of the estate are rarely a mod-
em consideration,10 in the analogous area of delinquent child support
payments, II in which the government frequently bridges the gap, the pos-
sibility that children will become wards of the state if disinherited is at
least as compelling a concern for the state as the possibility that surviving
spouses will become its wards.12
This statutory protection for adult spouses focuses more sharply the
concomitant need for statutory protection of children:
6. Id.
7. The elective share statute was passed in New York in 1929 to end "the glaring incon-
sistency in our law which compels a man to support his wife during his lifetime and permits
him to leave her practically penniless at his death." THIRD REPORT OF THE TEMPORARY
STATE COMMISSION ON THE MODERNIZATION, REVISION AND SIMPLIFICATION OF THE
LAW OF ESTATES, N.Y. LEGIS. Doc. No. 19 (1964) (footnote omitted) [hereinafter THIRD
REPORT ON ESTATES].
8. See, e.g., THIRD REPORT ON ESTATES, supra note 7, at 211; M. GLENDON, THE
NEW FAMILY AND THE NEW PROPERTY 31 (1981); W. MCGOVERN, S. KURTZ & J. REIN,
WILLS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES 89 (1988).
9. See, e.g., THIRD REPORT ON ESTATES, supra note 7, at 212.
While the "economic partnership of marriage" theory has been seen as a judicially conve-
nient way to express the interests of the spouses at divorce, it has been criticized as inapposite
to the real concerns between the parties at divorce. See, e.g., M. GLENDON, supra note 8, at
65-67; Batts, Remedy Refocus: In Search of Equity in "Enhanced Spouse/Other Spouse" Di-
vorces, 63 N.Y.U. L. REv. 751, 756-57 n.21 (1988).
10. See, e.g., M. GLENDON, supra note 8, at 18.
11. In 1985, for example, 26% of the child support payments awarded and due to begin
that year were not paid at all. Of the remaining 74%, it is not known how many were full
payments and how many were only partial payments. Of the 1,416,000 women who were
awarded child support in 1985 from a spouse of a prior marriage and who had remarried, 32%
did not receive child support payments in 1985. Of the 2,179,000 women who were divorced
but not remarried and were awarded child support in 1985, 25% did not receive the payment.
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES 368 (chart 609) (1989) [hereinafter STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATES].
12. "When a dependent family member is disinherited, however, the taxpayer's interest
again asserts itself, to be weighed together with the claims of the disinherited person. On the
other side of the scales are the interests of the intended objects of the decedent's bounty and
the policy of free testation." M. GLENDON, supra note 8, at 58-59. In ancient law, even when
the parent disowned or disinherited the child, the child still had to be supported out of the
estate. H. GROTIUS, DE JURE BELiLI AC PACIS, LIBRI TRES 273-(F. Kelsey trans. 1925).
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While few would gainsay the moral right of the spouse to protection
against disinheritance, a decedent's dependent children would seem to
have an even higher moral claim to such protection. Spouses, after all,
enter into the husband-wife relationship voluntarily at an age when
they can protect their interests while children do not volunteer to be
brought into the parent-child relationship thrust upon them at birth. 13
Indeed, the case for statutory protection of children is even more compel-
ling. Not only has the surviving spouse married knowingly and volunta-
rily, when old enough to protect his interests, but at the death of the
testator, he is or could become self-supporting. The surviving spouse
might have assets independent of the deceased, or may be able to estab-
lish another financially supportive relationship through remarriage or co-
habitation with a significant other. None of these options is available to
the minor child, who did not voluntarily or knowingly establish the fam-
ily relationship with the testator. If public policy has seen fit to protect
spouses from disinheritance, the same statutory protections should be
provided for children.
An equally significant consideration is the substantial fifty percent
divorce rate and the frequent incidence of remarriage,1 4 which often at-
tenuates the child's bond with one parent and leads to the increased pos-
sibility of disinheritance of children. 15 In 45.7 percent of the marriages
performed in the United States in 1985, one or both of the parties had
13. Rein, A More Rational System for the Protection of Family Members Against Disinher-
itance: A Critique of Washington's Pretermitted Child Statute and Other Matters, 15 GONZ. L.
REV. 11, 47 (1979).
14. See, e.g., M. GLENDON, supra note 8, at 30.
15. This problem was addressed in New York in 1963-65 by the Bennett Commission,
which was revising the estate law at that time:
As to the urgency for specific legislation to prevent the disinheritance of dependent
children in New York, statistics will probably never be available. Yet the high rate of
divorce and remarriage in this state, as elsewhere in the country, resulting in the fact
that testators frequently leave children of more than one marriage, makes the likeli-
hood that certain dependent children will be inadequately provided for, if not actu-
ally neglected, at least as great if not greater than in those countries presently having
either forced heirship or family maintenance laws. Some program for the protection
of dependent children would therefore seem to be in order.
FOURTH REPORT OF THE TEMPORARY STATE COMMISSION ON THE MODERNIZATION, REVI-
SION AND SIMPLIFICATION OF THE LAW OF ESTATES, N.Y. LEGIS. Doc. No. 19, at 146
(1965) [hereinafter FOURTH REPORT ON ESTATES] (footnote omitted).
Several commentators have recognized the plight of disinherited children and have ac-
knowledged that the lack of a remedy at law for them forecloses any opportunity to gauge
accurately how many children are affected. See, e.g., Cahn, Restraints on Disinheritance, 85 U.
PA. L. REv. 139, 144 (1936); Haskell, supra note 3, at 526; Nathan, An Assault on the Citadel:
A Rejection of Forced Heirship, 52 TUL. L. REV. 5, 16 (1977); Rein, supra note 13, at 14 n.16.
Authors of some empirical studies undertaken in the 1960s and 1970s, on the other hand,
have concluded that true disinheritance in America is rare. See, e.g., Dunham, The Method,
Process and Frequency of Wealth Transmission at Death, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 241, 257, 263
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been married previously. 16 Furthermore, since 1970 the annual divorce
rate in this country has increased while the marriage rate has declined. 17
The number of minor children involved in this increasing divorce rate
has grown: in 1970, it was 12.5 per thousand children; in 1985, it was
17.3 per thousand children."'
As a result of the increasing divorce rate, more children grow up
living with and knowing only one parent. In 1970, 85.2 percent of all
children under eighteen years of age lived with both parents; by 1987,
this figure was reduced to 73.1 percent.19 In 1970, 10.8 percent of minor
children lived with their mother alone; by 1987, this figure had risen to
21.3 percent.20 Furthermore, of those minor children living with their
mothers alone, 3.3 percent lived with divorced mothers in 1970, but the
percentage rose to 8.5 percent in 1987.21 The possible alienation and dis-
affection of the noncustodial parent toward the child might result in dis-
inheritance of the child who that parent never really knew.
To understand and attempt to reconcile the tension between the par-
ent-child bond and testamentary freedom, it is useful to consider both the
history of these concepts and the modem interests and concerns of the
surviving -family members, the state, and the public. This Article pro-
poses that a duty of continuing responsibility of parent for child should
be incorporated into the law of testate succession so that testamentary
freedom for the property owner with children is more circumscribed
than it is presently in most American jurisdictions. 22
Part I of the Article considers the historic sources of inheritance and
examines inheritance in countries outside of the United States. Part II
(1963); Fellows, Simon, Snapp & Snapp,,An Empirical Study of the Illinois Statutory Estate
Plan, 1976 U. ILL. L. F. 717, 731.
16. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 11, at 85 (chart 129).
Further breakdown of these statistics for 1985 shows that 11.5% were remarriages for the
man, 10.9% were remarriages for the woman, and 23.4% were remarriages for both. Id.
17. In 1970, the marriage rate was 10.6% and the divorce rate was 3.5%. In 1975, the
marriage rate was 10.0% and the divorce rate was 4.8%. In 1980, the marriage rate was
10.6% and the divorce rate was 5.2%. In 1985, the marriage rate was 10.2% and the divorce
rate was 5.0%. In 1987, the marriage rate was 9.9% and the divorce rate was 4.8%. THE
WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 807 (1989).
18. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 11, at 87 (chart 132).
19. Id at 52 (chart 71).
20. Id
21. Id
22. Since, after death, the former property owner hardly can be affected by any post
mortem disposition of the property, the concerns of the state and the living indeed could take
precedence over the wishes of the deceased. "Death renders less essential, not more, the lib-
erty to dispose of property." Samuel, Shaw & Spaht, Successions and Donations, 45 LA. L.
REV. 575, 594 (1984).
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discusses the tension between testamentary freedom and children's rights
of inheritance, and considers whether the historic adjustment of that ten-
sion should be reevaluated in light of today's fluid and multiple families.
Part III examines how other areas of the law have resolved their tensions
with testamentary freedom. Part IV proposes the concept of protected
inheritance for children as an additional, but not total, restriction on tes-
tamentary freedom. Protected inheritance seeks to take the best of the
family maintenance systems-flexibility toward need-and the best of
the modern forced heirship systems-automatic application, simplicity,
estate planning certainty-to suggest a system appropriate for the vast
majority of American jurisdictions in the 1990s and beyond. The Article
concludes that protected inheritance would be more consistent with the
societal view of the parent-child bond and more equitable than the law of
inheritance as it exists in most American jurisdictions today.
I. Inheritance Protection for Children
The idea of protected inheritance for children is neither new nor
uniquely suited to our American jurisdictions. It was practiced in an-
cient societies and documented, if not mandated, in ancient religious
texts. 23 It is currently practiced in many countries.24
A. Ancient Historical Roots
The United States is a relatively young country. Many of the social
and political ideas that took root here are either a reaffirmation of or a
revolt against experiences that originated in other, older cultural and
political systems. A search for the bases of our society's attitude toward
protected inheritance for children requires an examination of the histori-
cal attitudes toward protection in these other, older cultures and
civilizations.
It is not possible to trace definitively the legal history of the right of
children to inherit.25 One reason for this is that the practice or custom of
passing possessions from generation to generation developed long before
the formal law of inheritance was established. 26 The "unit" of the an-
23. See, e.g., Deuteronomy 21:16; RAMBAM (MAIMONIDES) Ch. 6, Laws 1-4, 11.
24. See infra notes 68-83 and accompanying text.
25. See, e.g., 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE
THE TIME OF EDWARD I 241 (2d ed. 1959); Kornstein, Inheritance: A Constitutional Right?
36 RUTGERS L. REV. 741, 753 (1984).
26. Henry Maine discusses pre-Roman, ancient Greek, Hebrew, and "Hindoo" [sic] so-
cieties and concludes that the "difficulty ... is to know where to stop, to say of what races of
men it is not allowable to lay down that the society ... was originally organized on the patriar-
chal model." H. MAINE, supra note 1, at 118-19. In discussing the elements of the patriarchal
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cient society was the family, not the individual; consanguinity, actual or
fictionalized by adoption into the "family," was the cohesive social
force.27
Family, familial obligations, and family protection were fundamen-
tal to survival in those ancient societies. The patriarchal model of an-
cient society, which vested the eldest male parent with absolute power
and authority over the members of the family and their possessions, in-
vested the head of the family with onerous obligations as well. The later
Roman version of the patriarchal model, the patria potestas, invested the
paterfamilas with duties or liabilities that balanced his omnipotent rights:
It was not a legal duty, for law had not yet penetrated into the pre-
cincts of the Family. To call it moral is perhaps to anticipate the ideas
belonging to a later stage of mental development; but the expression
"moral obligation" is significant enough for our purpose, if we under-
stand by it a duty semiconsciously followed and enforced rather by in-
stinct and habit than by definite sanctions. 28
This family duty, an almost involuntary human response, did not directly
shape the development of inheritance law. 29 Indeed, this preexisting and
traditionalized "family response" was often in tension with developing
law.30
model, Maine states: "[Tihe possessions of the parent, which he holds in a representative
rather than in a proprietary character, are equally divided at his death among his descendants
in the first degree... ." Id
27. Id. at 121, 123-27.
28. Id at 141 (emphasis added).
29. See Teitelbaum, Placing the Family in Context, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 801 (1989);
see also, H. MAINE, supra note 1, at 216.
Of course, there are examples of when the right to inherit did inform the development of
the law:
The sanctity of inheritance as the great safeguard of family security is a theme which
runs continually through the history of property. It would be hard to find a more
striking illustration than the charter of 1066: the Conqueror's message of reassur-
ance to the nation was in terms which all could appreciate: I "will that every child
be his father's heir."
T. PLUNKNETr, A CONCISE HIs:oRY OF THE COMMON LAW 712-13 (5th ed. 1956) (footnote
omitted). The Magna Carta of 1215 also recognized, in a fashion, a share of or legitim in the
dead man's estate for both the wife and the children. '2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra
note 25, at 350.
30. See, e.g., H. MAINE, supra note 1, at 140-41, 216; T. PLUNKNETT, supra note 29, at
711, 743; 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MArrLAND, supra note 25, at 245; Hafen, supra note 1, at 869.
Moreover, this tension between the family response and the political aim of the law is not
limited to ancient times or lands. Professor Stanley Katz discusses the new Soviet govern-
ment's unsuccessful attempt in 1918 to abolish inheritance. The 1918 law decreed that all
property would escheat to the state upon the death of the owner; the law was "quickly re-
duced" to "a mere 'declaratory statement.'" Later attempts to tax inheritance out of existence
in the U.S.S.R. "were equally ineffective." Katz, Republicanism and the Law of Inheritance in
the American Revolutionary Era, 76 MICH. L. REv. 1, 3 n.3 (1977). See also Korstein, supra
July 1990]
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Ancient historical sources seem to support a right of children to in-
herit.31 In fact, Roman wills or testaments originated to recognize le-
gally the family response that had been circumscribed by law: "It will be
found that Wills were never looked upon in the Roman community as a
contrivance for parting Property and the Family . . .but rather as a
means of making a better provision for the members of a household than
could be secured through the rules of Intestate succession."'32 Roman
freedom of testation emerged not to disinherit children, but rather to
protect adult or emancipated children who were not heirs under the then
existing laws of intestate succession.33 Thus, the advent of wills and tes-
taments, and later, Roman freedom of testation, were responses to a di-
vergence between the family response and the developing law:
We cannot, however, for a moment suppose that the limitations of the
family imposed by legal pedantry had their counterpart in the natural
affection of parents. Family attachments must still have retained that
nearly inconceivable sanctity and intensity which belonged to them
under the Patriarchal system .... It may be unhesitatingly taken for
granted that enfranchisement from the father's power was a demon-
stration, rather than a severance, of affection. . . . If sons thus
honoured above the rest were absolutely deprived of their heritage by
an Intestacy, the reluctance to incur it requires no farther
explanation. 34
Ancient history, then, would not be a likely source to support our predi-
lection for not protecting children.
B. The Feudal System in Medieval England
At the decline of the Roman Empire, the Roman Civil Code had
taken hold more tenaciously in some foreign lands than in others. 35
Although the Romans ruled Britain for 350 years,3 6 the Roman Civil
note- 25, at 756-57 (both the French and Soviet governments have come close to abolishing
inheritance).
31. See, e.g., 2 H. GROTIUS, supra note 12, at 269 n.2, 270; H. MAINE, supra note 1, at
191-92.
32. H. MAINE, supra note 1, at 188-89.
33. The rules of Intestate Succession, which the Romans must at this period have
practiced, account, I think-and more than account-for that vehement distaste for
an Intestacy to which Roman society during so many ages remained constant. The
order of succession was this: on the death of a citizen, having no will or no valid will,
his Unemancipated children became his Heirs. His emancipated sons had no share in
the inheritance.
Id. at 214.
34. Id. at 215-16.
35. See infra notes 64-83 and accompanying text.
36. T. PLUCKNETT, supra note 29, at 6.
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Code ultimately did not prevail in Britain.3 7 The British family response
of legitim, or the share of chattels that "by law or custom" went to the
surviving wife and children, 3  developed in England as early as the 1 100s
from that Roman influence. By the 1600s, however, the right to legitim
effectively had disappeared.3 9
German 4° and Anglo-Saxon4' influences in Britain after the fall of
Rome clearly show the existence of the concept of inheritance in the law,
if not its effect on the law.42 It was not until well after the Conquest,
however, that more definite rules of inheritance emerged in Britain. In
1066, William the Bastard became William the Conqueror and installed
37. Helmholz, Legitim in English Legal History, 1984 U. ILL. L. Rnv. 659, 672.
38. The law or custom of legitim was enforced by the Chancery Court:
If a testator leaves neither wife nor child, he can give away the whole of his moveable
goods. If he leaves wife but no child, or child but no wife, his goods must, after his
debts have been paid, be divided into two halves; one of these can be disposed of by
his will, it is "the dead's part," the other belongs to the widow, or (as the case may
be) to the child or children. If he leaves both wife and child, then the division is
tripartite; the wife takes a share, the child or children a share, while the remaining
third is governed by the will; we have a "wife's part," "bairns' part," and "dead's
part." Among themselves children take equal shares; the son is not preferred to the
daughter ....
2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 25, at 348.
39. Helmholz, supra note 37, at 665. Pollock and Maitland note that the legitim disap-
peared without a discernable legal trace by the 17th century:
Our English law seems to slip unconsciously into the decision of a very important
and debatable question. Curiously enough the Act of 1692, which enables the in-
habitant of the northern province to bequeath all his goods away from his family,
was professedly passed in the interest of his younger children. To the modern En-
glishman our modern law, which allows the father to leave his children penniless,
may seem so obvious that he will be apt to think it deep-rooted in our national char-
acter. But national character and national law react upon each other, and law is
sometimes the outcome of what we must call accidents.
2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 25, at 355 (footnote omitted). See also T.
PLUCKNETr, supra note 29, at 746 (Inheritance Act of 1692 did not revive legitim).
40. Under German laws of inheritance, which governed in parts of Britain in the post-
Roman, pre-Norman period, "[t]he kinsmen were called to the inheritance class by class, first
the children, then the brothers, then the uncles. The Lex Salica has a law of intestate succes-
sion; it calls the children, then the mother, then the brothers and sisters, then the mother's
sister." 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 25, at 250 (footnotes omitted). These laws
apparently applied to movables only, though the Lex Salica also addressed the inheritance of
land: "the dead man's land descends to his sons, and an express statement that women can not
inherit it is not deemed superfluous." Id at 251.
41. A doom of King Alfred speaks thus: "If a man has book-land which his kins-
men left him, we decree that he is not to alienate it outside his kindred".... [Thus];
here about the year 900, we see the current of legislation moving, at least for the
moment, in favour of the expectant heirs.
Id. at 253.
42. Id. at 255-56.
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the feudal system of sole ownership of land by the king.43 Barons could
"hold" land as "tenants" under the king, and in turn, others could hold
land as tenants of the barons, and so on." The imposition of this tenurial
system on the existing customs and laws of England exacerbated the re-
curring tension between family and law.45
The "great revolution of the twelfth century which produced primo-
geniture and freedom of alienation" caused a major change in inheri-
tance.46  Primogeniture, by which the eldest surviving son of the
decedent inherits all of his land or estate, was "not a natural part of the
law of inheritance, ' 47 but ultimately served the purposes of the king.
43. See, e.g., T. BERGIN & P. HASKELL, PREFACE TO ESTATES IN LAND AND FUTURE
INTERESTS 4 (2d ed. 1984).
44. Id. at 11-13.
45. For example, family preservation instincts as part of the family response were in ten-
sion with the lack of family generational security inherent in this tenurial system. Heirs of the
baron-tenant eventually secured the right to succeed the tenant in his fee:
The Conquest had settled many families which looked for their economic foundation
to purely feudal holdings.... [T]he Crown and other lords regarded these grants as
being for life only, but a long and persistent struggle ended with the recognition of
the heritability of these fiefs-indeed, the word fee finally became a term of art for a
heritable interest in land, so thorough was the victory of the family principle over
political feudalism.
T. PLUCKNETT, supra note 29, at 713 (footnote omitted).
This was a short-lived victory for the heirs, however, since the heir in the 12th century
had no legal recourse if his father, the holder of certain types of tenancies, conveyed away the
complete estate by an inter vivos transfer, even without the consent of the heir. Prior to this
period, there had been a long-standing restriction on the alienation of land in favor of the heir
apparent: any inter vivos disposition of land had to be with the consent of the heirs. This was a
family protection practice that was ultimately defeated by primogeniture:
We seem to see here ... the complement of that new and stringent primogeniture
which the king's court had begun to enforce. The object of the restraint in time past
had not been solely, perhaps not mainly, the retention of land "in a family"; it had
secured an equal division of land among sons .... It became useless, inappropriate,
unbearable, when the eldest son was to have the whole inheritance. No great harm
would be done to the feudal lords, at all events to the king, by abolishing it.
2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 25, at 311-12. The authors, in discussing the
apparently swift disappearance of this restriction on alienation in favor of the heir apparent,
are critical of the "high handed court of professional justices who were all for extreme simplic-
ity and who could abolish a whole chapter of ancient jurisprudence by two or three bold
decisions." Id. at 313.
46. T. PLUCKNETT, supra note 29, at 714.
47. 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 25, at 262.
The authors went on to distinguish this statement as "not referring to any fanciful 'law of
nature,' " but simply explaining that "the law of inheritance does not come by this rule if and
so long as it has merely to consider what, as between the various kinsmen of the dead man,
justice bids us do." Id.
Since neither justice nor nature require that primogeniture be the rule, the authors suggest
that the law of inheritance, by requiring primogeniture, is in effect ignoring the interests of the
dead man, his heirs and equity. With primogeniture, the law of inheritance is protecting "one
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Freedom of alienation gave control to the tenants-in-chief who could dis-
pose of their estates at will, to the detriment of their heirs.48 As stated by
one commentator:
Primogeniture upset everything. It is true that freedom of alienation
accompanied it and gave landowners the power to make their own dis-
positions, and that most of them no doubt used those powers reason-
ably; but nevertheless it is obvious that the law henceforth disclaimed
any responsibility for seeing that those dispositions were equitable.49
The law of descent, which predated by centuries the legal testamen-
tary capacity to convey land in England,50 controls how the decedent's
property would be distributed among the surviving kin or family.51
From the twelfth century on, it embraced primogeniture and expanded
its application to more and more classes of estates or fees throughout
England. The advantage of a system that provides that, "when one man
leaves the world one other should fill the vacant place,"' 52 was simplicity
of administration; primogeniture gave the king a limited number of ten-
ants to look to for the obligations of holders of the feudal estates. But
even though convenient for the lord and established as the law, primo-
geniture still had to contend with the family response. Primogeniture
had "to encounter a powerful force, a very ancient and deep-seated sense
of what is right and just. 5 3
who is a stranger to the inheritance, some king or lord, whose interests demand that the land
shall not be partitioned." IaL
48. T. PLUCKNETr, supra note 29, at 714.
49. Id. at 743.
50. H. MAINE, supra note 1, at 187-89.
51. The law of descent, or the law of intestacy, at that time can be thus described:
The first class of persons called to the inheritance comprises the dead person's de-
scendants; in other words, if he leaves an "heir of his body," no other person will
inherit. Among his descendants, precedence is settled by six rules. (1) A living de-
scendant excludes his or her own descendants. (2) A dead descendant is represented
by his or her own descendants. (3) Males exclude females of equal degree. (4)
Among males of equal degree only the eldest inherits. (5) Females of equal degree
inherit together as co-heiresses. (6) The rule that a dead descendant is represented by
his or her descendants overrides the preference for the male sex, so that a grand-
daughter by a dead eldest son will exclude a younger son.
2 F. POLLOCK & F. MArrLAND, supra note 25, at 260. The authors explain further, "The
preference of descendants before all other kinfolk we may call natural: that is to say, we shall
find it in every system that is comparable with our own." Id. at 260-61.
52. Id. at 274.
53. Id. at 265.
This tension between the sense of what was right and just-that is, all sons sharing
equally-and primogeniture was relieved somewhat by the development of the practice of sub-
infeudation, inter vivos transfers to younger sons that cut the overlord off from the services and
incidents of the tenancy of the subinfeudated land. In 1290, the Statute Quia Emptores at-
tempted to curb this by, among other things, forbidding subinfeudation and permitting aliena-
tion of the land by the tenant in fee simple. T. PLUCKNETr, supra note 29, at 715-16; F.
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Coupled with freedom of alienation, then, primogeniture54 set up a
legal structure whose primary concern clearly was not the family. As
one authority has stated: "Men had burst forth from the medieval collec-
tivism of the feudal system and had begun to learn of their inalienable
rights, while forgetting their inescapable obligations. '55 While the legal
framework was consistent with inheritance by children and in some ways
facilitated it,56 the lawgivers through the centuries of the English legal
system, unlike those of the Roman Civil Code, did contemplate and per-
mit the disinheritance of children. "It is in the province of inheritance
that our medieval law made its worst mistakes."' 57
C. Inheritance in the United States
The United States of America evolved after the suppression and sup-
planting of the indigenous Native American culture and laws by the in-
vading European peoples. France, Spain, and the Netherlands all
established colonies in the infant United States. Each of these countries
had and continues today to have some form of forced heirship for
children.5 8
(1) The British Colonies
The tradition of inheritance that British colonial America had was
that of the feudal system, not that of the Roman Civil Code. But the
colonies had revolted from the mother country. Founded on then cur-
rent democratic ideas, if not ideals, the colonies had an opportunity to
start anew with a form of government that could comprise only the best
of the past and discard all legal barriers that were inequitable and un-just.59 The American Revolution could have abolished inheritance alto-
POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 25, at 293. See also T. BERGIN & P. HASKELL, supra
note 43, at 16-17 (Quia Emptores as a reason for the slow erosion of feudal pyramids over
hundreds of years).
54. Primogeniture as a legal concept was not abolished in England until 1925. T. BER-
GIN & P. HASKELL, supra note 43, at 9.
55. Cahn, supra note 15, at 140.
56. The Statute of Wills, which in 1540 permitted alienation of land by writing for the
first time, along with freedom of alienation, provided avenues for a testator to provide equita-
bly for all his heirs.
57. F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 25, at 363.
58. See infra note 68.
59. Daniel J. Komstein argues that there is no constitutional right to inheritance in
America. In discussing the motivations of the founders, he states:
[T]he framers' intent must be looked at more generally to see if they viewed inheri-
tance as so fundamental a right as to deserve constitutional protection. Of great
relevance here is the nature of the American Revolution. Much more was involved
than a simple colonial break from England. There was in America at the time a
[Vol. 41
PROTECTED INHERITANCE
gether, especially if such abolition were consonant with the prevailing
views of the political revolutionaries. Abolition of inheritance was not,
however, on the agenda of this fledgling country.
One commentator has considered the political options available to
our founders regarding inheritance: "repudiation of the traditional con-
cept of inheritance" or "reform of the law of inheritance by excision of
what were regarded as its aristocratic excesses, namely primogeniture
and entail." 60 The author noted that Thomas Jefferson, who advocated
repudiation, 61 limited his goals to more equitable distribution of property
through inheritance, rather than abolition of inheritance altogether. Fur-
thermore, Jefferson recognized the integral role of family in inheritance:
[T]he consequences of this enormous inequality producing so much
misery to the bulk of mankind, legislators cannot invent too many de-
vices for subdividing property, only taking care to let their subdivision
go hand in hand with the natural affections of the human mind. The
descent of property of every kind therefore to all the children, or to all
radical transformation of political ideas, which included a desire to overturn the
stratified social and political order that had marked the Old World and that had been
reproduced to some extent in the colonies. The American revolt against rank and
birth opposed economic forms of privilege and inherited status in the political or-
der... Thus inheritance of property in colonial America reflected a paternalistic
and aristocratic bias incompatible with the economic and political goals of the
Revolution.
Kornstein, supra note 25, at 758-59 (footnotes omitted).
Considering that primogeniture, in which the eldest surviving son takes all, was the inher-
itance system in England at the time of the American Revolution, one might as readily argue
that the Civil Law solution of forced heirship among all children was an equally available
solution to the "economic and political goals of the Revolution." Primogeniture was the
method employed under the English feudal system to amass and maintain political, and later
economic, power among the few. By preventing division among heirs and thus dilution of
assets, primogeniture was a potent weapon of the few. See supra notes 46-49 and accompany-
ing text. Professor Katz, on the other hand, sees the American Revolution as more of a "re-
form movement" than an "internal revolution." He argues that terminating inheritance was
never a goal of the American Revolution: "The changes instituted in the law of inheritance
were not trivial or startling. Neither primogeniture nor entil, the principal targets of statu-
tory revision, were widely practiced before the Revolution ...so that in some sense the
Revolution cannot even be credited with truly reforming the law of inheritance." Katz, supra
note 30, at 26.
60. Katz, supra note 30, at 11. For a description of primogeniture, see supra notes 46-49
and accompanying text. "Entail," or "estate in fee tail," or "entailed estate" was a feudal
device whereby the original grantor of the estate could insure that his near lineal heirs would
not alienate the estate and thus deprive more distant lineal heirs of the estate. This restriction
was avoided through several ingenious ploys that in turn were thwarted by later statutes. See,
e.g., T. BERGIN & P. HASKELL, supra note 43, at 28-33.
61. Katz, supra note 30, at 18. In fact, Jefferson is described therein as standing "alone
among his American compatriots in espousing such radical views." Id.
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the brothers and sisters, or other relations in equal degree is a politic
measure, and a practicable one. 62
Thus, the most radical revolutionary of colonial America sought through
legislation merely to increase the number of beneficiaries under inheri-
tance, not to abolish it.
(2) Louisiana
The British feudal experience, while the main political root of inher-
itance in America, was not the only one.63 Shortly after the American
Revolution, France experienced its own revolution. The laws of inheri-
tance in France, as codified in 1803 in the Napoleonic Code and adopted
by Louisiana in 1825, took a radically different approach to the problems
endemic in the feudal concept of primogeniture. 64 In order to ensure
equality among heirs, all heirs were statutorily guaranteed a legitim or
forced share of the estate; the portion of the estate subject to this forced
share increased with the number of heirs.65
62. 8 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 682 (J. Boyd ed. 1950).
Professor Katz states that Jefferson recommended that the rules of inheritance require
wide distribution of a decedent's estate among his relations and that the state levy progressive
estate taxes on large estates. Katz, supra note 30, at 17. Daniel J. Kornstein, however, de-
scribes Jefferson as the "best known opponent of inheritance at the time" who was not alone
among the founding fathers in holding his views. Kornstein, supra note 25, at 760.
These conflicting views can be brought together if Jefferson is viewed as being opposed to
inheritance as he knew it, complete with dominant primogeniture and entailed estates artifi-
cially limiting the availability of land for productive use, not necessarily to the concept of
inheritance itself.
63. The Spanish Civil Code influence and the Dutch influence were also present in Colo-
nial America. See, e.g., Dainow, The Early Sources of Forced Heirship; Its History in Texas
and Louisiana, 4 LA. L. REV. 42, 54-56 (1941).
64. See, e.g., Lemann, In Defense of Forced Heirship, 52 TUL. L. REV. 20, 21-24 (1977)
(detailed description of the debates preceding the enactment of the pertinent Napoleonic Code
sections). Lemann notes that during the debates the desirability of total testamentary freedom
was not the issue, but rather how much of the estate should be subject to the forced share or
legitim. Id. at 24.
Professor Gerald Le Van traces the legitim through its ancient Hindu and Roman origins,
combines it with the Germanic concept of the "sib" or family ownership of lands, and notes its
unsuccessful confrontation with the political needs of feudal England. Le Van, Alternatives to
Forced Heirship, 52 TUL. L. REV. 29, 30-35 (1977). He notes that France was divided in its
hereditary practices and that the "French Revolution provided the catalyst for a synthesis of
sib and sacra and the complete elimination of primogeniture in France." Id. at 33.
65. Le Van notes that "since 1825, the reserve has remained at one-third if the decedent
leaves only one child, one-half, if two children, and two-thirds, if three or more. The forced
portion of surviving parents has remained at one-third (one-fourth for a sole surviving parent
as to separate property)." Le Van, supra note 64, at 35.
In 1981, the percentages subject to forced heirship were lowered so that only one-fourth
of the estate is subject to the legitim if there is one child and only one-half if there are two or
more children. Ascendant forced heirship, in which parents inherit, was abolished in 1981 as
well. Samuel, Shaw & Spaht, supra note 22, at 575-76.
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Until 1989 Louisiana maintained this statutory protection of the his-
toric right of heirs, regardless of age or need, to share in the estate of
their parents. 66 In July 1989, however, the Louisiana Legislature
adopted legislation limiting the protection of forced heirship to children
who are under the age of twenty-three or are incapacitated. This new
legislation is not without its vigorous opponents. 67 It is clearly antitheti-
cal to the concept of protected inheritance proposed herein.
D. Modern Approaches to Inheritance
There are two current practices for protecting the inheritance of
children. One is the forced heirship provisions employed by the Scandi-
navian countries as well as many countries that follow the civil code.68
The other is the family maintenance system adopted by the common-
wealth countries. 69
(1) Forced Heirship
Countries other than the United States have found niore responsive
means of addressing the tension between protection of children and testa-
mentary freedom. Today, Scandinavian and civil code countries protect
lineal descendants by a statutory allocation of some portion of the dece-
dent's estate.70
Sweden protects the right of children to inherit by considering inva-
lid any will that gives away so much of the testator's estate to third per-
sons that children are left less than one-half of what they would have
66. Even in Louisiana, forced heirship is not without its critics. See, eg., Le Van, supra
note 64, at 48-49 (suggesting that forced heirship is partly a product of tradition and inertia
and advocating its repeal in favor of an alternative form of family maintenance); Nathan, supra
note 15, at 5 (noting that Texas did try forced heirship in the 1850s, but repealed it after ten
years).
Though "the Louisiana Constitution forbids the abolition of forced heirship" altogether,
the Louisiana legislature is empowered to determine "who the forced heirs are and how-much
they are entitled to claim as their legitime." Samuel, Shaw & Spaht, supra note 22, at 575.
67. At the meeting of the Civil Law and Procedure Committee on June 13, 1989, which
reported out SB 264 with amendments, opponents of the bill were heard. Among others, Pro-
fessor Fred Swain of Loyola Law School challenged the constitutionality of the bill with the
arbitrary age cut off of 23 years. Professor Cynthia Samuel of Tulane Law School felt that
more wills would be contested under the new law than in the past. She also stated that "if the
concept of the parent-child relationship as a lifetime relationship is 'gone and only lasts for a
certain period of time until a child reaches 23, and then, forget it, I think we're in trouble.'"
Transcript, Minutes of Meeting, Civil Law and Procedure Committee, June 13,. 1989, at 6.
68. For the forced heirship provisions of 27 countries, see Digest of Laws, International
Section in 8 MARTINDALE-HUBBELL LAW DICTIONARY (1990).
69. See infra notes 86-97 and accompanying text.
70. See supra note 68.
July 1990]
received under intestacy (the legitim).71 In Finland, the decedent's abil-
ity to dispose of property by will is "restricted only by the right of a
lineal descendant to his so-called portion-at-law, namely half the share he
would have inherited if the decedent had died intestate. In spite of a will,
a lineal descendant is always entitled to this portion."'72
Spain has a variant of the legitim: "the concept of mejora whereby a
decedent was free to use half the reserve (protected share of the estate) to
favor one or more forced heirs. Moreover, the reserve was fixed at two-
thirds, regardless of the number of forced heirs."'73 Puerto Rico, the
other United States jurisdiction that protects children in addition to Lou-
isiana, has a variant of the mejora. The "legal portion" in Puerto Rico is
"that part of the property which the testator cannot dispose of because
the law has reserved it for specified heirs ' 74 including lineal descendants.
The "legal portion" for children is "two-thirds of the hereditary estate of
the father and of the mother." Either parent, however, may reserve one-
third of the two-thirds as an "advantage" or "extra portion" and use it to
favor "one or more of their children or descendants" above their "legal
portion." 75
In Greece, forced heirs, including children, are entitled to one-half
their intestate share, and the testator cannot dispose of property by will
to the detriment of the forced share of the heirs; if he does, the will is
null.76 In Switzerland, the testator may dispose of his estate by will only
after deducting the "compulsory portion"; for children, it is three-fourths
of the statutory share of inheritance. The statutory or intestate share for
children is the entire estate if there is no surviving spouse and three-
fourths of the estate when there is a surviving spouse.77 In France, the
disposable share by will is determined by the number of children that the
testator has: one-half if one child, one-third if two children, and one-
fourth if three or more children.78
71. Tottie, Family Law, in AN INTRODUCTION TO SWEDISH LAW 224 (S. Stromholm 2d
ed. 1988). Professor Tottie notes that the descendant in this situation may apply for an adjust-
ment of the will. Id.
72. Aarnio, Family Law and the Law of Succession, in THE FINNISH LEGAL SYSTEM 176
(J. Uotila 2d ed. 1985).
73. Le Van, supra note 64, at 34 (footnote omitted).
74. P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 31, § 2361 (1967).
75. Id. §§ 2363, 2391.
76. Grammaticaki-Alexiou, The Law of Succession, in INTRODUCTION TO GREEK LAW
150 (K. Kerameus & P. Kozyris ed. 1988).
77. 3 I. WILLIAMS, THE SWISS CIVIL CODE 111-12, 114 (2nd ed. 1976) (English
Version).
78. C. cIv. art. 913 (Fr.).
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 41
While the legitim effectively disappeared in most of England and its
affiliated countries,79 Scotland continued to honor the legitim and today
recognizes this right statutorily. Applicable to the "net moveable es-
tate," or personal property of the decedent, the legitim essentially is di-
vided equally among children, or their share divided among their lineal
descendants.80 'Children are entitled to. one-third of the moveable estate
if there is a surviving spouse or one-half if there is not.81 Parents cannot
contract out of a child's right to legitim in an antenuptial contract unless
the child agrees to accept the provisions made for him in the contract.82
Although highly selective and clearly nonexhaustive, this descrip-
tion of certain modem countries'8 3 resolutions of the conceptual conflict
between the parent-child bond and testamentary freedom helps put in
perspective the position of the majority of United States jurisdictions.
The Civil Code resolution clearly is influenced by its ancient Roman her-
itage of family-oriented law. It is a compromise that recognizes the legit-
imacy of both concepts: the testator has freedom to dispose of a portion,
but not of the entire estate; the family of the testator, including the chil-
dren, has a statutorily protected right to a portion, but not to the entire
estate.
Commentators critical of the lineal descendant, forced heirship pro-
visions in Louisiana argue that the concept is anachronistic; difficult to
apply to moveable, modem sources of wealth;84 rigid; obstructive to
modem estate planning; inimical to the interests of surviving spouses;
and blind to the actual circumstances of the forced lineal heirs.8 5 Never-
theless, forced heirship as a viable, modem concept is very much in
evidence.
(2) Family Maintenance Systems
The common law countries' resolution of the conflict between the
parent-child bond and testamentary freedom-the family maintenance
system-while not as dispositive and uncontrovertible as that of many
civil code countries, nevertheless is more flexible and balanced than most
United States jurisdictions. Under a family maintenance system depen-
79. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
80. Succession Act of 1964, ch. 41, §§ 10, 11 (Scot.).
81. R. OUGHTON & E. TYLER, TYLER'S FAMILY PROVISION 1 (2d ed. 1984).
82. Succession Act of 1964, ch. 41, § 12 (Scot.).
83. For the forced heirship provisions of 27 countries, see Digest of Laws, International
Section in 8 MARTINDALE-HUBBELL LAW DICTIONARY (1990).
84. See, e.g., Lemann, supra note 64, at 24-25; Nathan, supra note 15, at 8.
85. See, e.g., Nathan, supra note 15, at 9-13; see also, Le Van, supra note 64, at 42-43;
infra notes 148-160 and accompanying text.
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dent children, among other categories of claimants, may initiate court
proceedings seeking discretionary judicial intervention to provide for
their needs if left out of the will.86
a. New Zealand
New Zealand is the premier example of the statutory family mainte-
nance system solution. In 1900 it passed the Family Protection Act,87
which has been described as "the most comprehensive and uncompro-
mising version" of the family maintenance system.88 Modified in 1939 to
apply to intestate inheritance as well, the Act
assures to a decedent's surviving family, above all his spouse and chil-
dren, adequate maintenance whenever his will does not provide it ....
A dependent who claims that the will failed to make proper provision
for him may apply to the court within twelve months of probate. Eligi-
ble dependents are not only the testator's spouse, child, or grandchild,
but also his parents and his adopted and illegitimate children. Upon
application the court will determine whether the testator has ade-
quately provided for the dependent. 89
Under the Act, it is the court that exercises wide discretion in determin-
ing whether the testator adequately provided for the dependent, whether
the dependent's conduct merits the court's intervention on her behalf,
from which testamentary assets payments will be made, whether periodic
or lump sum payments will be made, and on what terms the payments
out of the estate will be made to the dependent. 90 The court can main-
tain jurisdiction over the matter to make adjustments for changed cir-
cumstances. 91 In applying the Act, courts have recognized that
"maintenance means more than mere subsistence. ' 92
The court does not operate in a vacuum in reviewing a particular
dependent's application under the Act; the situation of others who have
not applied but are dependent on the estate also is taken into account. 93
Need is the chief operative consideration and the court applies a means
86. For the family maintenance provisions of 21 jurisdictions, see Digest of Laws, Interna-
tional Section in 8 MARTINDALE-HUBBELL LAW DICTIONARY (1990).
87. The Testator's Family Maintenance Act, N.Z. Stat. No. 20 (1900).
88. Laufer, supra note 3, at 282. Professor Laufer states that some form of the family
maintenance system has been adopted in 14 other common-law jurisdictions, including all
Australian jurisdictions, five Canadian provinces and, of course, England. Id. at 284.
89. Id. at 282.
90. Id. at 282-83.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 290.
93. Rein, supra note 13, at 48.
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test, looking to all financial resources available to the dependent, whether
included in the estate for other purposes or not.94
One authority has summarized the profound effect of the Act:
As a result of this development, family maintenance has in substance
been transformed in New Zealand from a mere limitation on testamen-
tary power into a general principle of the law of succession: the rules
of intestate succession or the provisions of a will (or both combined)
become operative only after maintenance of the decedent's dependents
out of his estate has been adequately safeguarded. 95
New Zealand, then, has resolved the tension between the parent-child
bond and testamentary freedom by separating out the elements of each
concept and elevating certain aspects of the parent-child bond over cer-
tain aspects of testamentary freedom. When there is need on the part of
a dependent, that need is addressed, testamentary wishes notwithstand-
ing; when there is no need, testamentary wishes are followed.
b. England and Wales
England and Wales also had a more restricted form of family main-
tenance protection. In 1975, however, England and Wales seriously
challenged the position of the New Zealand Act as "the most compre-
hensive and uncompromising version" when Parliament expanded the
category of dependents who could apply for relief under its own inheri-
tance act.96 New Zealand's potential claimants are family members such
as spouses, children, stepchildren, parents, and grandchildren; English
and Welsh case law, however, has interpreted their statute to include
"mistresses, lovers, sisters and children of mistresses." 97
The significance of this expanded class of applicants is the flexibility
and pragmatism underlying the legal recognition and codification of cer-
tain expectations and rights of extralegal, but nonetheless "familial," re-
94. Id. at 48-49.
95. Laufer, supra note 3, at 284 (emphasis added).
96.' R. OUGHTON & E. TYLER, supra note 81, at 198.
97. Id. (footnotes omitted). More precisely, the Inheritance (Provision for Family and
Dependents) Act of 1975 permits the following categories of persons to apply for "reasonable
financial provision" when either testate or intestate provisions are inadequate or nonexistent:
(a) the wife or husband of the deceased;
(b) a former wife or former husband of the deceased'who has not remarried;.
(c) a child of the deceased;
(d) any person (not being a child of the deceased) who, in the case of any marriage to
which the deceased was at any time a party, was treated by the deceased as a child of
the family in relation to that marriage;
(e) any person (not being a person included in the foregoing paragraphs of this sub-
section) who immediately before the death of the deceased was being maintained,
either wholly or partly, by the deceased ....
Inheritance Act (Provision for Family and Dependents Act), 1975, ch. 63, § 1.-(l).
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lationships. This expansion in effect further restricts testamentary
freedom, not only to protect the traditional "legal" family and its attend-
ant obligations, but also to recognize and protect the "natural" and infor-
mal family, along with its obligations. Procedurally, however, this
broadening of claimants merely expands the classes of individuals who
still must bring a lawsuit and establish need or dependence in order to
prevail.
Critics of the concept of family maintenance point out that it re-
quires a lawsuit to be activated, thus increasing litigation in already over-
worked judicial systems; that it does not set forth clear guidelines for the
testator who would, in a will, honor its requirements if they were explic-
itly stated; and that the ad hoc, highly discretionary process is too un-
wieldy to be effective. 98 One commentator, however, has documented
that, at least in New Zealand, a "climate of decision" has generated pre-
dictability for estate planning and avoidance of frivolous suits and that
voluminous lawsuits "have not materialized. "99
The fortune of New Zealand and England in avoiding a deluge of
litigation from the family maintenance system may not repeat here, of
course, where litigation may be "the American way." This is of special
concern since one must litigate to take advantage of the maintenance
system. °° With the exception of England, "no jurisdiction with as large
a population as New York has adopted it." 1°o Moreover, the uncertainty
of what a court in its discretion might do would make effective estate
planning more difficult for the conscientious testator, who would prefer
to know what the law requires. Yet, compared to the total lack of pro-
tection present in most American jurisdictions, the family maintenance
system does have advantages for protecting children.
From the foregoing, one can see that United States jurisdictions that
permit disinheritance of children10 2 have not addressed the tension be-
tween the parent-child bond and testamentary freedom, much less begun
to resolve it. The issue thus raised is whether, in light of the considerable
number of divorces and multiple marriages in America today, the con-
ceptual conflict between the parent-child bond and testamentary free-
dom, as part of the larger and more ancient tension between the family
response and the law generally, should now be resolved by protecting
children by statute.
98. See, e.g., Laufer, supra note 3, at 312; Rein, supra note 13, at 53.
99. Laufer, supra note 3, at 313-14; Rein, supra note 13, at 15, 53-54.
100. See, e.g., THIRD REPORT ON ESTATES, supra note 7, at 211.
101. Id. at 212.
102. See infra note 314 and accompanying text.
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II. The Internal Tensions Among the Multiple
Aspects of Inheritance
The tension between the family response, formalized in ancient tra-
dition and custom,10 3 and the law of inheritance, which developed for
nonfamilial purposes, further complicates the analysis of inheritance.3°4
Theorists disagree on the source of the inheritance right: is it a natural,
and therefore irrevocable,. right or, as the positivists argued, a civil or
statutory, and therefore terminable, right?105 There also is the two-sided
coin aspect of inheritance: the "heads" side being the right of the dece-
dent to control disposition of the estate, and the "tails" side being the
right of the heir to receive the inheritance.10 6 Throughout history and
into the present, neither side of these paired aspects of inheritance has
triumphed completely over the other in any absolute sense: one aspect
may be "down" in current public favor, but it is never permanently
"out. °10 7 In analyzing whether there can be viable American laws to
protect children in this area, 108 it is helpful to look at the historical ratio-
nales for inheritance'0 9 and the perceived advantages and disadvantages
of the two-sided aspect of inheritance.
103. See supra notes 25-30 and accompanying text.
104. See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text for a discussion of this tension during
the feudal period.
105. See, eg., Chester, Inheritance and Wealth Taxation In a Just Society, 30 RUTGERS L.
REV. 62, 78-81 (1976); Katz, supra note 30, at 18; Kornstein, supra note 25, at 749-53.
106. Kornstein, supra note 25, at 749. Many authorities concentrate on the decedents', or
"heads" part of the two-sided aspect of inheritance; the focus of this Article, however, is on the
heirs,' or "tails" side of that coin.
107. See, e.g., M. GLENDON, supra note 8, at 244.
108. As Mr. Lemann noted:
Instead of Louisiana's abolishing its system of forced heirship for children, other
states should perhaps consider following Louisiana's system. That very suggestion
has recently been put forward by a writer [Paul G. Haskell] from a common law
state, who observed that "failure to protect the children defies explanation," citing
with approval the Louisiana legitime.
Lemann, supra note 64, at 24 n.36 (citation omitted).
109. An even more fundamental tension, which is beyond the scope of this Article, is
whether the law should recognize inheritance at all. As an alternative to inheritance, the law
could require that property escheat to the state at death. While there may be fruitful debate on
this question, this Article assumes the existence of inheritance. See infra note 262 and accom-
panying text; T. ATKINSON, LAW OF WILLS 30-36 (2d ed. 1953); Chester, supra note 105. But
see A. GULLIVER, E. CLARK, L. LUSKY & A. MURPHY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON GRATUI-
TOUS TRANSFERS 3 (1967).
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A. The Sources of Inheritance
While both the naturalists and the positivists agreed that upon death
property should return to its natural state, 110 namely the sovereign, or
common pool, until earned or claimed by another individual, they each
offered their own explanations of why, instead, it is presumed to go to the
children of the decedent. The natural law theorists opined that, whether
by will or by operation of the laws of intestacy, it is "of nature" that
family rather than strangers should acquire the possessions of the de-
ceased.' 11 Indeed, were a Roman to attempt to use a will to leave his
possessions to other than his family, the will was overborne. 112 "Nature
is the best teacher of all animate beings as regards the preservation not
only of themselves but also of their offspring, to the end that as a result of
this affection for kin the stock by uninterrupted succession may complete
the circle of eternity." 1 13
These idyllic explanations of inheritance from the school of natural
law, however, did not sufficiently impress the positivist theorists. Black-
stone maintained that legislation, not nature, developed the law of wills
and intestacy "in order to avoid that confusion which [property's] be-
coming again common would occasion."'"14
Whichever explanation of the source of inheritance is accepted-the
idyllic one of inheritance being the natural familial response, or the prag-
matic one of legislative intervention preventing resultant chaos from a
110. John Locke, a Naturalist, acknowledged that property owned by an individual in life
should at death be returned to "the common stock of Mankind" but for the natural human
drives of self-preservation and procreation, which give children "a Title to share in the Prop-
erty of their Parents, and a Right to Inherit their Possessions." J. LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF
GOVERNMENT § 88 at 224-25 (P. Laslett rev. ed. 1967) (3d ed. 1698); Blackstone, a positivist,
concurred:
For, naturally speaking, the instant a man ceases to be, he ceases to have any domin-
ion: else, if he had a right to dispose of his acquisitions one moment beyond his life,
he would also have a right to direct their disposal for a million of ages after him:
which would be highly absurd and inconveniernt. All property must therefore cease
upon death. ...
2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *10.
111. 2 H. GROTIUS, supra note 12, at 265, 269. John Locke said:
Men are not Proprietors of what they have meerly for themselves, their Children
have a Title to part of it, and have their Kind of Right joyn'd with their Parents, in
the Possession which comes to be wholly theirs, when death having put an end to
their Parents use of it, hath taken them from their Possessions, and this we call
Inheritance.
J. LOCKE, supra note 110, § 88 at 225.
112. H. MAINE, supra note 1, at 185.
113. 2 H. GROTIUS, supra note 12, at 270 (quoting Diordorus Siculus).
114. 2 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 110, at *11.
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July 1990] PROTECTED INHERITANCEfree-for-all property grab at the death of the owner-the family and chil-
free-for-all property grab at the death of the owner-the family and chil-
dren are the beneficiaries, not the state by escheat or society at large. 115
B. The Two-Sided Coin
The naturalists stated it was "natural" for property to go to the fam-
fly rather than strangers; the positivists preferred property to go to the
family to avoid confusion. Neither school assumed a concomitant right
in the children or the family to receive the property that the testator had
a right to give to them. 116 This right, however, has been recognized in
both ancient and modem law.1 17 The tension between the justifications
advanced for the "heads" side of the coin of inheritance, the right of the
testator to control disposition, and those for the "tails" side of that coin,
the right of the heir to receive the property, is itself historic.
(1) Perceptions of Inheritance, from the "Heads" Side
For the "heads" side, inheritance means freedom of testation-the
right of the testator to control post mortem disposition of the property.
How much control the testator has is the issue here, for freedom of testa-
tion has always been a relative term; the testator has never enjoyed abso-
lute freedom of testation.11 8
One perceived advantage of testamentary freedom is that it is "a
logical extension of an owner's freedom to deal with his property during
his lifetime."' 19 While testamentary freedom may be a "logical exten-
sion" of a property owner's control over property owned while alive, it is
not clear that it is a necessary, inevitable, or equitable extension.1 20 As
one "heads" commentator has postulated:
Whether inheritance is or is not a property right is the very question to
be decided. That inheritance is ancillary to property is uncontro-
verted. The real question.., is whether or not the ability of the prop-
erty owner to control the devolution of property after his death is a
necessary attribute of his right to enjoy that property while alive.121
115. See supra note 109.
116. See infra note 128.
117. See supra notes 23-102 and accompanying text.
118. See, e.g., 2-F. POLLOCK &-F. MAITLAND, supra note 25, at 349-50; M. RHEINSTEIN
& M. GLENDON, THE LAW OF DECEDENTS' ESTATES 8 (1971); Haskell, supra note 3, at 501;
Kornstein, supra note 25, at 755-56.
119. R. OUGHTON & E. TYLER, supra note 81, at 31.
120. "It seems odd that we unhesitatingly restrict a living person's freedom of alienation in
order to protect his dependents and yet, with sublime inconsistency, we fairly blanch at the
idea of imposing similar restraints on the same person once he is dead." Rein, supra note 13,
at 19.
121. Kornstein, supra note 25, at 747.
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If the freedom to control property while alive is the basis for extending
that freedom into death, however, it would be more "logical" to extend
into death the same kind of "freedom" that was exercised in life. In
reality, this freedom to deal with property during life is more illusory
than real.
Society does not hesitate to restrict the uses to which a property
owner, while alive, may put his property when it is unreasonably harmful
to others,122 when he has obligations of family support, 123 or when he is
indebted to others. 24 Moreover, each of these legal incursions into the
property owner's freedom directly affects the owner while alive. In light
of the current legal incursions already made into the property owner's
use and enjoyment of property while alive, it is not so clear that testa-
mentary control over property at death is at all "logical,"' 125 much less
necessary or equitable.
Testamentary freedom "enables a living person to extract advan-
tages from others in return for the hope of a favourable mention in the
deceased's will." 126 This recognized power of the testator is a substantial
source of tension between the "heads" side and the "tails" side, and the
state is held hostage by the former. For under the law as it exists now in
all American jurisdictions except Louisiana, the state by omission con-
sistently supports the testator.
When there is disagreement about a proper course of action for a
child to take, or not to take, the parent can always exercise the final and
unilateral sanction of disinheritance. There is no objective determination
of whether the parent or the child is right in the dispute. Yet, by permit-
122. See, e.g., Spur Indus., Inc. v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 108 Ariz. 178, 184, 494 P.2d
700, 706 (1972); Morgan v. High Penn Oil Co., 238 N.C. 185, 194, 195, 77 S.E.2d 682, 690
(1953).
123. See, e.g., Rein, supra note 13, at 15-18.
124. Haskell, supra note 3, at 501.
125. Judges sometimes proclaim that "[tihe wishes of the dead are more sacred than
the dispositions of the living," but they never say why this should be so. Is there any
rational basis for such a claim? ... Certainly common sense tells us that we should be
more concerned with the rights of the living than with the rights of the dead. Senti-
mentality is a luxury we can hardly indulge when such indulgence harms the society
of the living. Moreover, interference with a living property owner's dominion consti-
tutes a much greater encroachment on individual liberty and freedom of disposition
than could any conceivable postmortem restraint.
Rein, supra note 13, at 19.
126. R. OUGHTON & E. TYLER, supra note 81, at 32. See also, W. McGOVERN, S. KURTZ
& J. REIN, supra note 8, at 88 (noting that King Lear was mistreated by his daughters after
their share of his estate was secure, but also suggesting that testamentary freedom can be
misused by parents who seek to control the lives of their adult children).
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ting and enforcing the disinheritance, the state indirectly is making the
judgment automatically and consistently in the parent's favor. 127
The other perceived substantive advantage of testamentary freedom
is that "guaranteed inheritances cause heirs to cease to work and so
reduces the total wealth of the country." 128 Perhaps in an age when
physical danger, rampant disease, frequent wars, plagues, natural disas-
ters, and myriad other life-threatening and shortening factors severely
curtailed adult life expectancies, the fear of children "waiting around" to
inherit, rather than getting on with their own lives, may have had some
currency. In our present era of miracle drugs, life-saving surgery and
technology, health and fitness consciousness, and better diet, all resulting
in increased longevity, it is not likely that sixty-year-old "children" are
holding their lives in abeyance, waiting for eighty-five and ninety-year-
old-parents to finally die and leave them an inheritance. 129
In sum, the presumed advantages of testamentary freedom discussed
above are generally illusory. Those that have some currency today are
arguably inequitable. In light of current encroachments on testamentary
127. See Teitelbaum, Family History and Family Law, 1985 Wis. L. REv. 1135, 1174-76
(commenting that the effect of courts' hands-off attitudes in family matters really is to "ratify
the power of one family member over others.").
128. R. OuGHToN & E. TYLER, supra note 81, at 32-33 (footnote omitted). A similar
theme is noted in a critical comment on the French Code by Professor Le Van: "the French
compromise not only 'atomizes successions' but also takes away from the privileged heir that
economic incentive that would otherwise keep him active and intelligent." Le Van, supra note
64, at 34 (citation omitted).
From the historical perspective, Bracton argues against the legitim: "for a citizen could
scarcely be found who would undertake a great enterprise in his lifetime if, at his death, he was
compelled against his will to leave his estate to ignorant and extravagant children and unde-
serving wives." 2 H. BRACTON, ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 181 (S. Thorne
ed. 1968).
Blackstone had similar views:
While property continued only for life, testaments were useless and unknown: and,
when it became inheritable, the inheritance was long indefeasible, and the children or
heirs at law were incapable of exclusion by will. Till at length it was found, that so
strict a rule of inheritance made heirs disobedient and headstrong .... This intro-
duced pretty generally the right of disposing of one's property, or a part of it, by
testament .....
2 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 110, at * 12.
This sentiment is also shared by Professor Nathan: "children who know they will inherit
from their parents, and who know they cannot be disinherited, can essentially ignore their
parents with the confidence that they will nonetheless inherit a large portion of their parents'
estates." Nathan, supra note 15, at 15.
129. For children born in the United States in 1987, the life expectancy was 74.9 years
(71.5 male and 78.3 female). STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF.THE UNITED STATES, supra note 11,
at 71 (chart 106).
July 1990] PROTECTED INHERITANCE
freedom for the protection of surviving spouses, 130 creditors,13 ' and state
and federal coffers, 132 children deserve similar consideration.
(2) Perceptions of Inheritance from the "Tails" Side
For the "tails" side, inheritance means the guaranteed right to in-
herit a share of the testator's assets. In all American jurisdictions this is
a legally protected right under the laws of intestacy; it is only when the
parent has written a will that the existence of the child's right is at issue.
Historically and in several modem countries today, one protection
for the child's inheritance interest has been the legitim or forced heirship.
Forced heirship is the guaranteed right of a child to inherit some of his
parents' estate.
a. Perceived Historic Advantages
Forced heirship is said to promote family bonding, stability, solidar-
ity, harmony,4and responsibility; however, some commentators disagree
with this assertion. 133 Some commentators argue that forced heirship
creates family bonding, or a reciprocal exchange between family and in-
dividual of loyalty, security, and "a sense of the continuity of life and
responsibility for future generations."' 134 This argument relies on a defi-
nition of bonding that is grounded in the traditional interrelationship of
family with economics and property. This definition, however, may not
be appropriate in the 20th century. 135 A state-recognized continuing ob-
ligation based on kinship certainly reinforces state approval and support
of the family unit. On the other hand, the stubborn persistence of the
family unit in some form or another in modem times among many resi-
dents of the United States, despite the lack of a legitim or forced share in
130. See infra notes 291-97 and accompanying text.
131. See infra notes 280-90 and accompanying text.
132. See infra notes 275-79 and accompanying text.
133. See, e.g., J. DUKEMINIER & S. JOHANSON, FAMILY WEALTH TRANSACTIONS,
WILLS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES 120 (2d ed. 1978); Cahn, supra note 15, at 144-45; Samuel,
Shaw & Spaht, supra note 22, at 592. But see Kornstein, supra note 25, at 770-71; Nathan,
supra note 15, at 15-16.
134. Samuel, Shaw & Spaht, supra note 22, at 592. See also infra notes 259-262 and ac-
companying text.
135. Mary Ann Glendon notes that 20th century family bonding has itself changed from
the traditional notion of bonding to a "relatively loose bonding," and defines "loose bonding"
as "the comparative ease with which individuals can and do move into and out of family
relationships." M. GLENDON, supra note 8, at 17. She quotes Lawrence Stone in describing
this 20th century bonding as "intense affective and erotic bonding" rather than the more tradi-
tional bonding considerations of economics and property. Id. at 17-18. Despite "loose bond-
ing," however, a "legal attenuation of connections between parents and adult children" does
not necessarily presage "an actual loosening of family bonds." Id. at 115.
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most jurisdictions, greatly attenuates the argument of the need for a legi-
tim or forced heirship to maintain family stability, harmony, and
responsibility.
Forced heirship recognizes both consanguinity and dependence.1 36
As discussed below, 137 the decision to become a parent and accept the
attendant joys and responsibilities of the child's dependence is worthy of
formal renewal and acknowledgment at the death of the parent. The
symbolism of the share may be more meaningful to the child than the
substance of it; 138 the cost to the unwilling parent who is now dead is, if
anything, negligible by comparison.
More significantly, because of its blanket applicability, forced heir-
ship ensures that the "financial needs of the child, regardless of his age or
condition" are met in the first instance by the parent and not the state.' 39
While this is closely related to the "moral" obligation of a living parent
to "support, maintain, educate, and provide for the future of his chil-
dren,"140 it is also of compelling interest to the state, which would prefer
to have the parent provide for the child rather than have the child de-
pend on the state. It would be economically inefficient, inequitable, and
illogical to force the state to allocate its limited resources to provide for a
child when the parent has left assets at death that could do so.
Forced heirship also acknowledges the economic, family co-owner-
ship theory, giving back to those who contributed to the accumulation of
the wealth, directly and indirectly. This factor applies equally to chil-
dren and surviving spouses, although the nature of the contributions of
the child in the modem, nonagricultural, protective child-labor law con-
text is different.' 4 '
136. Cahn, supra note 15, at 145.
137. See infra Part IV.
138. See infra note 261 and accompanying text.
139. Calm, supra note 15, at 145. See also, Rein, supra note 13, at 55 (such an approach
will insure fairness to all parties involved in the decedent's estate).
140. Samuel, Shaw & Spaht, supra note 22, at 594. See also Rein, supra note 13, at 15-18
(statutes and case law demonstrating that society views the support of minor or dependant
children as a high policy). Professor Haskell states most emphatically that our laws impose
the obligation of support on individual family members for one another, with exceptions for
the unworthy:
[Flew would seriously question the propriety of these obligations; it is clear that the
law in its imposition of such obligations reflects accurately the attitude of our society
with respect to family responsibility. If it were suggested that such duties are im-
proper .... it is doubtful that one would attract a following except from among the
dissolute and the depraved. Such is the moral sensitivity of our society.
Haskell, supra note 3, at 500.
141. Halbach, An Introduction to Chapters 1-4, in DEATH, TAXES AND FAMILY PROP-
ERTY 6 (1977); Cahn, supra note 15, at 145. See infra notes 366-67 and accompanying text.
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Another social interest that forced heirship satisfies is "our general
feeling that a child has a reasonable expectancy from his father and our
repugnance to the disappointment of that expectancy."1 42 One source of
this general feeling is the status of kinship, of belonging to this particular
family unit. Our repugnance at the expectation's disappointment is
based in part on the fact that under existing law there need be no reason
or justification for that disappointment. This expectation, whether a nat-
ural right or a cultural product, is entrenched in our laws of intestacy, 143
yet totally discarded when in tension with testamentary freedom.
Forced heirship also is credited with providing a "legally protected
status to each child, as well as a measure of equality among children."'144
Of course, to the extent that forced heirship dictates a known minimum
and an equal allotment of the estate among children, it would minimize
fraternal competition and foster familial harmony. On the other hand,
the status of each child at the death of the testator parent may require
different allotments, a fact that the current forced heirship concept does
not address.
Another perceived advantage of this inheritance scheme benefits the
testator as well: "The ability to give at death provides psychological sat-
isfaction to the donor in two ways. First by treating property as an ex-
tension of personality, the donor is able to achieve a measure of
immortality. Second, giving expresses love, a value society should en-
courage." 145 It may be questionable how far the immortality aspect of
giving can continue beyond the first testamentary disposition because of
the dilution by subsequent dispositions and the immortality then at-
tached to those subsequent testators. Giving as an expression of love is a
more universal experience. It is difficult to argue that society should not
encourage love; the more relevant inquiry, however, is whether society
can legislate love. In other words, the question is whether societal legis-
lation of an obligation to leave something to one's children when the
means to do so are present is a desirable societal objective in lieu of indi-
vidual motivations generated by love.
In sum, several of the advantages of inheritance from the child's side
may be more idyllic, but remain just as illusory as many of the benefits of
142. Cahn, supra note 15, at 144.
143. See, e.g., T. ATKINSON, supra note 109, at 32-33.
144. Samuel, Shaw & Spaht, supra note 22, at 593.
145. J. DUKEMINIER & S. JOHANSON, supra note 133, at 120. See also Halbach, supra
note 141, at 5 (an argument in support of inheritance is that it reinforces family ties and
provides individuals with the comfort of knowing that even after their death, they will be able
to provide for their loved ones).
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testamentary freedom. The 1990s definition of family., may be a far cry
from the romantic family ideal of bygone eras; but nevertheless we do
have families in America today. It is questionable, however, whether we
have "a sense of the continuity of life and responsibility for future gener-
ations,"1 47 as evidenced by our testamentary permissiveness.
The idealistic goals of forced heirship-a fostered sense of family,
kinship, identity, belonging, and commitment-are attributes that would
be appropriate for society to encourage. The more difficult question is
whether, when the family response is absent, the state can legislate it into
existence. Perhaps the better state objective would be to protect its citi-
zens from the consequences of this lack of familial sense, bonding, and
responsibility for future generations. Thus, when the family response is
not inherent in the family context, the state should seek to legislate at
least the economic protections that would flow to the children were the
family response functioning.
Certain procedural aspects of forced heirship, such as the simplicity
of automatic application without court process, the certainty of its appli-
cation by way of a fixed share of less than the entire estate, and the pro-
tection of the child, either in her expectations or her actual needs, seem
to recommend the adaptation of forced heirship principles for our mod-
em needs and purposes.
b. Perceived.Historic Disadvantages
Forced heirship is not without its critics.148 Forced heirship has
been termed anachronistic. 149 It is an historic, traditional, even ancient
recognition of a right in children based on family. Since it also currently
is practiced in many countries of the world, however, it is neither
"chronologically out of place [n]or incongruous in the present. 150 In-
deed the modem multiple marriage trend brings into focus a pressing
need for some guaranteed protection for the children of prior marriages.
As currently practiced in many countries, forced heirship divides
equally some set portion, less than the whole, of the estate among the
146. "In 1988, 27%, or 24.6 million, of the country's 91.1 million households fit the tradi-
tional definition of a family-two parents living with children. In 1970 the proportion was
40%." Family Redefines Itself, And Now the Law Follows, N.Y. Times, May 28, 1989, at E6,
col, I.
147. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
148. See supra notes 66, 84-85 and accompanying text.
149. An "anachronism" is "a person or thing that is chronologically out of place; esp: one
from a former age that is incongruous in the present." WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE Dic-
TIONARY 40 (1973).
150. Id.
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children of the deceased.'15 Neither the size of the estate, the age of the
children, nor the need of the children is relevant. Thus, forced heirship
has been criticized for being rigid and blind to the actual circumstances
of the forced lineal heirs. 152
This criticism is accurate. Forced heirship, the distribution of the
estate by intestacy in the absence of a will, and the operation of the statu-
tory elective share for surviving spouses153 all dispose of property with-
out regard to the particularized needs of the recipients. Forced heirship
formalizes the ancient familial distribution of the decedent's estate to the
decedent's kin; the emphasis is on family, not individual need. This is
not to say, however, that a plan that would be more sensitive to different
needs of children, while taking advantage of the simplicity and automatic
features of forced heirship principles, should not be considered. 54
Further criticism of forced heirship results from the direct competi-
tion of the child's protected right with that of the surviving spouse. In-
deed, there seems to be initial support for this criticism from an analysis
of the empirical studies of public opinion on these issues.' 55 Most of
those interviewed would leave most, if not all, of small estates to the
surviving spouse only, contrary to the property distribution of most in-
testacy laws between surviving spouse and children. 56 This preference
did not continue when there were remarriages, adult children, or chil-
dren of prior marriages. 5 7 Moreover, at least one of these studies
showed that the public felt that the responsibilities of the surviving
spouse toward the minor children were so compelling that the award to
the surviving spouse was contingent on it being used for the support of
the children. 5 8
Significantly, the current statutory protections for surviving spouses
could operate further to disinherit children by permanently foreclosing
the rights of the children to assets of their first decedent parent. For
example, if S1, a young surviving spouse, were to remarry and then pre-
decease S2, despite any preventive measures attempted by a will of S1,
the elective share would operate to permit S2 to take a large portion of
Sl's estate, which might be made up of the assets of Sl's first spouse, the
151. See supra note 68.
152. See supra notes 66, 84-85 and accompanying text.
153. See infra notes 291, 295 and accompanying text.
154. See infra Part IV.
155. See infra notes 210-20, 229-47, 264 and accompanying text.
156. See infra notes 195-204, 210-20 and accompanying text.
157. See infra notes 233-47, 250-57 and accompanying text.
158. See infra notes 248-52.
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first testator parent. 159 Such would not be the case, however, if the inter-
est of the children were recognized and protected at the death of Sl's first
spouse.
The difficulty in applying forced heirship to moveable property and
the resulting obstruction to modem estate planning are two additional
criticisms that have been leveled against forced heirship. Of course, his-
torically the legitim only applied to chattels or moveable property, 16° so
the change in the nature of modem wealth from land to movables hardly
presents anything new to forced heirship.
While it may be possible that a forced share might inhibit imagina-
tive and tax-advantageous estate planning maneuvers, dealing with the
forced share as a known and invariable obligation would be identical to
the adjustments necessary in estate planning when the spousal elective
share statutes were passed. Indeed, estate planners could take advantage
of the known quantity aspect of forced heirship in planning the estate.
C. Modem Considerations
Our legal system, based on legal precedent, would not and should
not eschew legal customs, beliefs, and practices hailing from that same
tradition. Nevertheless, the durability of the legal system stems in great
part from its flexibility and adaptability to needed change. Many of. the
advantages of both sides of the inheritance coin developed in historic
times when economic circumstances made these perceptions appropriate
and functional. In light of current economic practices, sources of wealth,
technological advances, and dependent international economies, what are
the perceived advantages or concerns of each side today?
(1) The "Heads" Side
Freedom of testation developed in Roman times to permit decedents
to include adult emancipated children in the distribution of their assets
because the intestate law of that time excluded adult emancipated chil-
dren. 161 In other words, it developed as the antithesis of what it can be
used for today, namely, the disinheritance of children. Because of the
looser family bonding and freer intimate associations enjoyed by many
159. See infra note 291.
A pre-nuptial agreement that waived any rights the subsequent spouse had in the estate of
the surviving parent could prevent this, but not many average Americans do, would, or know
how to take advantage of this somewhat sophisticated legal protection.
160. See, eg., supra notes 38-39, 79-82 and accompanying text.
161. See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text.
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today, 162 it is quite possible for testators to develop family-like attach-
ments, affections, and loyalties for individuals who are not or cannot be
recognized legally as family, and to desire to provide for them in a
will. 163 Forced heirship, however, does not engulf the entire estate of the
testator.164 Even with forced heirship-and with protected inheritance
as proposed herein165-the decedent can still provide for those nonfamily
attachments out of the part of the estate that is not claimed by forced
shares of legal family members.
A testator today may wish to differentiate among his children. One
obvious reason for a testator to treat his children differently is that some
may be minors who currently are dependent on the testator and whose
immediate substantive needs are being met by the testator. The adult
children, whose needs had been met during the life of the testator, have
an expectation of inheritance that often must be subordinated to the
needs of the minor children. As proposed herein, 66 differentiation based
on the minority or dependence of some of the children would be ad-
dressed by protected inheritance. Other bases for differentiation, how-
ever, such as subjective feelings or the testator's beliefs about the
worthiness of a particular child, still could be vented out of the portion of
the estate that is not subject to forced shares. Nonetheless, most chil-
dren 1 67 would be protected from outright disinheritance by the minimum
share proposed by this Article.
Testators rightly are concerned with intelligent and economically ef-
ficient estate planning. A forced share for children might impede partic-
ular plans. To the extent the amount of the share is fixed, however, it is a
known factor around which the estate planner can work. Estate planners
similarly had to adjust to forced shares decades ago when states adopted
the elective share for spouses.
Testators want to ensure that the assets designated in the will to
benefit the children actually are used for that purpose. From empirical
studies of public attitudes toward inheritance, it is clear that testators are
concerned about what will happen to their children when financial mis-
162. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
163. Same-sex lovers or extramarital lovers may be extremely important to the testator,
but society does not protect them through intestacy laws or forced heirship. Freedom of testa-
tion thus would be the only recourse of a testator to protect these loved ones. The right of the
testator to protect these relationships, however, should not be at the expense of the testator's
children.
164. See supra note 68.
165. See infra Part IV.
166. See infra notes 322-33 and accompanying text.
167. Those children who meet the objective criteria for disinheritance could be left with
nothing. See infra notes 338-41 and accompanying text.
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management by or remarriage of the surviving spouse interferes with the
testator's expectations.168 Thus, children from prior marriages often are
provided for specially. This concern of testators matches the protected
right of children to inherit as proposed herein. It is a common concern
of the two sides of the coin of inheritance, and its resolution also may
ease some of the traditional tension between them.
(2) The "Tails" Side
Minor and dependent children have a clear and pressing need for
continued support beyond the death of their parents. While the law has
not recognized anypost mortem obligation of a parent to a child,169 it is
clear that the death of the parent has not changed either the age or de-
pendence of the child; the need continues, even though the preferred
source has died. And although the parental support obligation is appli-
cable to both parents, in many instances the surviving parent may not
have sufficient independent resources to provide for the child. Thus, the
state must step in and support the child while the deceased parent is free
to leave estate assets to strangers at the expense of both the children and
the state. Support for minor and dependent children is a mutual con-
cern, then, of both the children and the state.
All children, regardless of age or need, have a recognized expecta-
tion of inheritance from their parents. 70 Those testators who do provide
for their children share in that expectation. Unless the interest of the
children in those assets is recognized and protected at the death of the
first parent, however, intervening circumstances may abort the plans and
expectations of both the children and the testator. Dissipation of assets
by the surviving spouse because of incompetence, poor advice, or inten-
tional waste will defeat the expectations of the children and the testator.
Remarriage by the Surviving spouse may defeat their expectations if the
surviving spouse predeceases the new spouse and the new spouse claims
an elective share of the assets. Disinheritance of the children by the sur-
viving spouse, despite "understandings" with the testator, would defeat
the expectations of the children and the testator. In this modern era of
multiple divorce and remarriage, this possibility increases, but it was not
unheard of through the centuries. 171
168. See, eg., infra notes 233-47 and accompanying text. Respondents to interviews on
inheritance expressed their concerns on these matters-and opted for different dispositions be-
cause of them. Id.
169. See infra notes 314-18 and accompanying text.
170. See supra notes 142-43 and accompanying text.
171. See, eg., BROTHERS GRIMM, Sweetheart Roland, Cinderella, Snow White and the
Seven Dwarfs, Hansel and Gretel, in GRIMMs FAIRY TALEs 62, 155, 166, 330-31 (E. Lucas, L.
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Thus, when reasons for either testamentary freedom or protection of
children are considered in the context of today's world, although there
are still tensions, it appears that there are also common interests. The
real question is whether the need today to guarantee some portion of the
estate left by the decedent to the children of the decedent is of sufficient
societal interest to encroach further on the already restricted freedom of
testation. In seeking some balance between these two competing con-
cerns, it is helpful to inquire into the public's views on whether the finan-
cial, moral, and legal obligations of the parent to the child should end, as
they do in most American jurisdictions, upon the death of the parent
who has willed his assets elsewhere. 172
D. Public Opinion of the Law of Inheritance
Empirical studies of people's knowledge of and attitudes toward the
laws of inheritance both in the United States 173 and in England 174 were
carried out from the mid-1950s until the late 1970s. The purpose, scope,
form, content, and follow-up procedure on the introductory questions
differed in each study. The sizes of the statistical samples and the demo-
graphic backgrounds of those interviewed varied widely. Limitations in-
herent in any empirical undertaking involving personal interaction, such
as subjective and subconscious messages emanating from the tone, inflec-
Crane & M. Edwardes trans.); Vassilissa The Fair in THE FIREBIRD AND OTHER RUSSIAN
FAIRYTALES 63, 66-67 (J. Onassis ed. 1978).
172. See, e.g., Haskell, Restraints Upon The Disinheritance of Family Members, in DEATH,
TAXES AND FAMILY PROPERTY 105, 114-15 (E. Halbach ed. 1977); Haskell, supra note 3, at
502; Rein, supra note 13, at 12, 18.
173. See, e.g., J. COHEN, R. ROBSON & A. BATES, PARENTAL AUTHORITY: THE COM-
MUNITY AND THE LAW (1958) (a study of 860 rural and urban residents of Nebraska); M.
SUSSMAN, J. CATES & D. SMITH, THE FAMILY AND INHERITANCE (1970) (1965 study of 659
decedents' estates in Cuyahoga County, Ohio, as well as 1234 survivor interviews); Dunham,
supra note 15 (1959-60 study of 97 probated estates in 1953 and 73 estates of decedents who
died in 1957 in Cook County, Illinois); Fellows, Simon & Rau, Public Attitudes About Property
Distribution at Death and Intestate Succession Laws in the United States, 1978 AM. B. FOUND.
RES. J. 319 (1977 telephone survey of 750 people in Alabama, California, Massachusetts, Ohio,
and Texas); Fellows, Simon, Snapp & Snapp, supra note 15 (Illinois telephone survey of 182
completed interviews); Note, Intestate Succession in New Jersey: Does It Conform to Popular
Expectations? 12 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 253 (1976) (authored by Joel R. Glucksman)
[hereinafter Note, Intestate Succession in New Jersey] (study undertaken in 1974-75 of 100
probated estates of Morris County residents who died in 1971, and a 1975 telephone survey of
approximately 50 Morris County residents); Note, Contemporary Studies Project: A Compari-
son of Iowans' Dispositive Preferences with Selected Provisions of the Iowa and Uniform Probate
Codes, 63 IOWA L. REV. 1041 (1978) [hereinafter Note, Iowans' Dispositive Preferences] (study
of estates filed in 1973-74 and interviews with both 101 survivors of those estates and 600
members of the general public).
174. See, e.g., J. TODD & L. JONES, MATRIMONIAL PROPERTY (1972) (survey conducted
in England and Wales interviewing 1877 married couples and 600 formerly married persons).
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tion, and body language of the interviewer, as well as the subjective inter-
pretation, assumptions, and intelligence of the interviewee, affected the
studies. These imperfections notwithstanding, an analysis of these stud-
ies is useful.
(1) Summary of Findings
These empirical studies reflect the effect of changing societal family
patterns. Intentional disinheritance of children is quite rare. 175 In the
earlier studies the expectation of the testator that the surviving spouse
would leave the assets to their common children meant a postponement
of inheritance rather than outright disinheritance. 176 In the later studies,
undertaken at a time when the divorce and remarriage rates were in-
creasing, 177 the testator's concern for the children was expressed by the
testator's use of a separate provision in the will for the children. 178
The testators in these studies were motivated more by the practical
need to provide for both a surviving spouse and children with limited
resources than by an abstract assertion of testamentary freedom. This is
not to say that the testators were not aware of or interested in the preser-
vation of this right;179 rather, they attempted to reconcile it with their
recognized familial obligations. Limited assets, rather than testamentary
freedom, seemed to be the controlling factor in distribution of the
estate. 180
In the earlier studies, where the survivors of the testators were or
were expected to be both the testator's children and a spouse who was
the natural parent of those children, the majority of people- either left the
entire estate to the surviving spouse or thought the law of intestacy
should accomplish this.1 81 This was true where the estate was small, but
this consensus was markedly reduced when the estate was increased in
size. 182
A pattern emerged in the later studies: the testator, although leav-
ing the majority of the estate to the surviving spouse in the traditional
family pattern, often made specific provisions for the children independ-
ent of those for the surviving spouse. Assets were left directly to the
children, or uncertainty over what the surviving spouse actually would
175. See infra notes 192-93, 196-99, 202, 208-09 and accompanying text.
176. See infra notes 195-204 and accompanying text.
177. See supra notes 14-21 and accompanying text.
178. See infra notes 236-47 and accompanying text.
179. See infra notes 221-28 and accompanying text.
180. See infra notes 210-20 and accompanying text.
181. See infra notes 195-204 and accompanying text.
182. See infra notes 211-20 and accompanying text.
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do for the children was expressed. 183 When the questions asked specifi-
cally about provisions for children from other marriages or children not
living with the respondent, the distribution of the estate differed signifi-
cantly from the traditional pattern used when the surviving spouse was
the natural parent of children.184
The later studies also show an increasing awareness of the parental
obligation of support for the children. In one study, respondents sponta-
neously included a requirement that the estate left to the surviving
spouse be used for the benefit of the minor children. 8 5
The data demonstrated the symbolic significance of generational
transfers 186 to both the testator and the children. In one study, children
who were disinherited by their father in favor of their aunt were upset
despite the fact that they knew the estate was insolvent. 87
Finally, when the personal experience of the respondent was fac-
tored into the study, those who had been separated, divorced, or remar-
ried gave significantly different responses from those who had not. 88
a. Rare Intentional Disinheritance
In the 1950s Nebraska study, 8 9 the respondents were asked whether
parents should be allowed legally to will property outside the family and
leave nothing to the children. 90 The difficult decision whether to pro-
vide for both surviving spouse and issue was eliminated because the ques-
tions assumed that there was no surviving spouse. 19 1  Of those
183. See infra notes 250-57 and accompanying text.
184. See infra notes 233-47 and accompanying text.
185. See infra notes 248-52 and accompanying text.
186. See infra notes 258-62 and accompanying text.
187. See infra note 261 and accompanying text.
188. See infra notes 264-67 and accompanying text.
189. J. COHEN, R. ROBSON & A. BATES, supra note 173.
190. The actual initial inquiry on this topic was as follows:
Suppose that either the husband or wife is dead, and the survivor willed all of his or
her property to persons or groups outside the family, and left nothing at all for the
children. If the parent is legally allowed to do this, it could mean that the child
might have to depend on some outside source for the necessities of life. On the other
hand, if the parent is prevented by law from doing this, he would not be able to will
his property as he sees fit. In these circumstances, do you think that the parent
should legally be allowed to will all of his or her property to persons or groups
outside the family and leave nothing at all for the children, or should the law prevent
this?
Id. at 76.
. 191. Id. at 44, 76-78. While the absence of a surviving spouse in the questions may ac-
count for the greater overall support for protection of the interests of children found in this
early study, it also focused the inquiry solely on the children, unhampered by surviving spouse
considerations.
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interviewed, 93.4 percent believed that parents should not be allowed to
disinherit children under twenty-one years of age; 63.4 percent felt par-
ents should not be allowed to disinherit children over twenty-one years of
age. 192 Ninety-two percent felt that parents should not be allowed to
disinherit children who are poor, and 57.3 percent felt that parents
should not be allowed to disinherit children who are well-off finan-
cially. 193 The authors noted, "[T]here appears to be an impressively high
degree of agreement in the population that parents do have an obligation
to their children which extends beyond their own death."1 94
The 1963 Cook County, Illinois study showed that all testators in
the sample survived by both a spouse and issue left the entire estate to the
spouse alone. 1" This finding would seem to indicate that the preference
in Cook County was to disinherit children, at least when there was a
surviving spouse. The author suggested, however:
The fact that 100 percent of the wills where there is a surviving spouse
and children produced a technical disinheritance of the children by
leaving all to the wife must mean that most testators do not regard this
method of distribution to be a "disinheritance." If this conclusion is
correct, it follows that the true meaning of disinheritance in the minds
of people using the term is that which results only on the final distribu-
tion from one generation to the next, that is, when the surviving spouse
distributes and excludes children or includes persons other than
children. 196
When the testators in the sample had no surviving spouse, but only chil-
dren, as in the Nebraska study, twenty-two out of the twenty-four wills
left the estate to the children; children were disinherited in only two
cases. 197 Similarly, in the mid-1970s Iowa study, 198 when there was no
192. Id. See also M. GLENDON, supra note 8, at 24 ("Opinion studies done in France
indicate that, while attitudes there are favorable to improvement in the position of the surviv-
ing spouse, there is also substantial continuing attachment to the traditional idea that property
should be preserved for children.").
193. J. COHEN, R. ROBSON & A. BATES, supra note 173, at 177.,
194. Id at 78. Analysis of the social profiles of the population interviewed showed that,
while the overall population supported obligations of parents to children beyond death, there
was more support among the rural than the urban respondents for more parental authority
over children as well as parental obligations toward children. Id at 128-31.
Respondents with children tended to be slightly more protective of children against disin-
heritance than those without children. Id at 296. Respondents over 40 years of age tended to
favor protecting the child more than those under 40. Id at 278. Protestants more than
Catholics would not allow disinheritance when the child was well off financially. Id. at 274.
Respondents with no college education tended to protect children over 21 years of age more
than those with some college education. Id at 282. Those in the higher income brackets
tended to disinherit more than those in the lower brackets. Id. at 286.
195. Dunham, supra note 15.
196. Id at 256.
197. Id From this, the author concluded that "disinheritance even in the sense of distri-
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surviving spouse but only minor and adult children, seventy-seven per-
cent preferred dividing the estate equally between the adult and minor
children. 199
The 1965 Ohio study2°° found that eighty-five percent of those stud-
ied20 1 left the entire estate to the surviving spouse when the decedent was
survived by both a spouse and children. The authors explained, however,
that the eighty-five percent figure was not a strict and permanent disin-
heritance of the children, but rather a postponement of their inheritance.
They stated, "[A] man may leave all to his wife with the assurance that
she will leave her estate to their common children. '20 2
When adult children were the only survivors, fifty-seven percent of
the testators left equal shares of the estate to their children and also made
dispositions to other relatives and friends. 20 3 Of the survivors inter-
viewed, however, ninety-one percent left equal shares to their adult chil-
dren but did not distribute the entire estate to them.2°4
Finally, a 1977 five-state telephone survey20 5 focused on the issue of
how the respondents would want their estates distributed between surviv-
ing spouse and children, both when the children were minors and when
the children were minors and adults. While there was no separate ques-
tion regarding surviving spouse and only adult children, 20 6 the authors
butions from the last survivor of the parents is not a major problem." Id. Whether the author
would so conclude today, in light of our more recent multiple divorce and remarriage syn-
drome, is not clear.
198. Note, Iowans' Dispositive Preferences, supra note 173.
199. Id. at 1102.
200. M. SUSSMAN, J. CATES & D. SMITH, supra note 173.
201. Id. at 89 (Table 5-1).
202. Id. This belief was borne out by the actions of the intestate survivors who in essence
signed over their intestate interests to the surviving spouse. Their explanatory remarks "indi-
cated that they made no searching analysis in reference to this decision. It was a matter-of-fact
action; in their family it was the right and proper thing to do." Id. at 127. The same belief
also was supported by hypotheses from the 1974-75 Morris County, New Jersey study in
which the author stated that, while the study did not test for it, most people probably assumed
that the children should receive the property upon the death of the surviving spouse. Note,
Intestate Succession in New Jersey, supra note 173, at 273 n.70.
203. M. SUSSMAN, J. CATES & D. SMITH, supra note 173, at 98.
204. Id. at 101. The authors concluded that disinheritance rarely occurs. Id. at 312.
Again, whether the authors would so conclude today, based on examination of estates pro-
bated in the late 1980s compared with estates probated in 1964-65, is not clear.
205. Fellows, Simon & Rau, supra note 173.
206. The questions were:
1. How would you like your property distributed if you were survived by your
(wife/husband) and a minor son and daughter both by your present marriage?
2. How would you like your property distributed if you were survived by (wife/
husband), a minor child, and an adult child?
Id. at 358.
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theorized that when the children are adults the balance would shift in
favor of the surviving spouse:
[T]he problem becomes one of balancing the interest of the children in
obtaining some of the deceased's property without waiting for the sur-
viving parent to die and the interest of the surviving spouse to have
available the accumulated weath [sic] of the marriage so as to mini-
mize the risk of financial insecurity. Once the problem is so character-
ized, the claims of adult children to their parents' estates would seem
to be less deserving than the claims of surviving spouses. Adult chil-
dren are likely to be self supporting; therefore, a delay in inheritance or
possibly even permanent disinheritance because of mismanagement by
the surviving spouse does not warrant depleting the financial resources
of the spouse, who is likely to have established a financial interdepen-
dence with the decedent, or even to be wholly dependent on the
decedent.207
Despite their analysis, the authors found that when the distributees were
minor children and a surviving spouse, 58.3 percent of the respondents
would give the entire estate to the surviving spouse; when the distributees
included an adult child, however, only 51.6 percent would give the entire
estate to the surviving spouse.208 The authors conceded that this finding
of recognition of adult children was consistent with other studies.20 9
b. Size of the Estate as a Factor
Many of the studies showed that as the size of the estate increased,
the number of respondents willing to leave the entire estate to the surviv-
ing spouse decreased. The 1963 Cook County, Illinois study210 showed
that when the estate was 36,000 dollars, eighty-five percent of the respon-
dents would choose to leave the entire estate to the surviving spouse.
When the estate was described as 180,000 dollars, however, only twenty-
five percent would -choose to leave the it entirely to the surviving
spouse.211 Likewise, while the 1965 Ohio study212 found that eighty-five
percent of those studied213 left the entire estate to the surviving spouse
when the decedent was survived by both a spouse and children, this was
more likely when smaller estates were involved and there had been no
remarriage. 214 The 1970-71 English study215 found that "[m]ore people
207. IM: at 355-56 (footnotes omitted).
208. Id. at 359 (Tables 11-12). However, the division between minor children and adult
children in this latter group was equal; adults were not favored over minors.
209. Id. at 358 & n.132.
210. Dunham, supra note 15.
211. Id at 260.
212. M. SUSSMAN, J. CATES & D. SMrrH, supra note 173.
213. Id at 89 (Table 5-1).
214. Id at 90, 290.
215. J. TODD & L. JONES, supra note 174.
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thought the children should have a share when the value of the estate
was higher. ' 21 6 The mid-1970s Iowa study217 found that "[a]lthough a
majority of Iowans want the spouse to receive 100 percent of relatively
small estates-those valued at less than $50,000-only a minority of
Iowans want the spouse to receive 100 percent of estates valued over
$100,000.11218 Similarly, in the 1974-75 Morris County, New Jersey
study,219 as the size of the hypothetical estate increased, the share of the
surviving spouse decreased: when the estate was ten thousand dollars, all
of it went to the surviving spouse; as the estate increased to one million
dollars, the surviving spouse's share decreased to about half of the
estate.
220
c. Testamentary Freedom
Two studies explored the significance of testamentary freedom. In
the 1970-71 English study,221 sixty-nine percent of the husbands and
sixty-five percent of the wives felt a man should have testamentary free-
dom to exclude children from his will, while only twenty-one percent of
the husbands and twenty-six percent of the wives felt the children should
be protected by law.222 In choosing a method of inheritance protection
for children, only twenty-nine percent of the husbands and thirty-three
percent of the wives felt the legitim system should be employed over the
family maintenance system.223 When asked what kind of inheritance
protection a spouse should get, fifty-seven percent of the husbands and
fifty-nine percent of the wives said that the testator should be required to
provide for them in the will.224
In the 1977 five-state telephone survey, 22 5 the public was asked
whether testators should be limited to naming relatives and friends of
long standing as beneficiaries and if so, why.226 While eighty-nine per-
216. Id. at 54.
217. Note, Iowans' Dispositive Preferences, supra note 173.
218. Id. at 1091.
219. Note, Intestate Succession in New Jersey, supra note 173.
220. Id. at 274.
221. J. TODD & L. JONES, supra note 174.
222. Id. at 48. Similarly 73% of the husbands and 67% of the wives favored testamentary
freedom over forced inclusion of children when the testator was a mother. Id.
223. Id. at 49. It is interesting to note, however, that of the vast majority who felt protec-
tion through application to the court was preferable to a legitim system, only 9% gave as a
reason that children should have no special rights. Id. at 50.
224. Id. at 47.
225. Fellows, Simon & Rau, supra note 173.
226. The precise questions on this topic were:
1. Should the law limit inheritance to either relatives, to friends of long standing, or
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cent of those interviewed felt there should be no restrictions generally,227
further inquiry established that under certain conditions only forty-three
percent felt that there should be no restrictions.228
d. Changing Family Patterns as a Factor
In the 1965 Ohio study,229 the authors noted, "It should be
remembered that children expect to inherit from their surviving parent;
hence, they are not irrevocably renouncing their rights to the property.
This expectation, however, is not as likely when the surviving spouse is a
stepparent." 230 Indeed in intestacy cases, when the heirs received part of
the small estate they often willingly signed over their interest to the sur-
viving spouse.231 This was not true, however, in those estates where the
surviving spouse was not the natural parent of the surviving children.232
The mid-1970s Iowa study233 asked respondents for their estate dis-
tribution preferences if they were survived by a spouse and two minor or
adult children.2 34 Sixty-one percent would leave the entire estate to the
spouse.235 When the surviving spouse was not the parent of the surviving
children, however, respondents were asked how they would like their es-
tate distributed between the spouse and adult children. 236 Only twenty-
nine percent allocated the. entire estate to the surviving spouse.237 The
authors explained that this smaller percentage was an indication "that
the respondents felt the stepchild would need protection from disinheri-
to organizations to which an individual has had a long time connection or should
there be no restrictions at all on the way a person distributes his property?
2. Why do you feel that way?
Id. at 335.
227. Id. at 336.
228. Id Those certain conditions included leaving the estate to pets. Id
229. M. SUSSMAN, J. CARES & D. SMrrH, supra note 173.
230. Id. at 128.
231. Id at 126-28. The authors also note, however, that this generosity may have been
prompted somewhat by the fact that Ohio has a "liable relative law" by which children and
other relatives could be compelled by the state to support needy relatives. Id at 144.
232. Id at 128-31, 144.
233. Note, Iowans' Dispositive Preferences, supra note 173.
234. The actual questions asked were: "How would you like your property distributed if
you were survived by your wife/husband and two minor children?" and "How would you like
your property distributed if you were survived by your wife/husband and two adult children?"
The researchers noted that there was minimal difference in response based on whether the
children were minors or adult. Id at 1084 n.227.
235. Id. at 1085.
236. The actual question asked was: "Suppose you have been married twice. How would
you like your property distributed if you were survived by your wife/husband and two adult
children? One child is from your present marriage and one is from your previous marriage."
Id at 1094.
237. Id at 1095 (Table 17).
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tance by the stepparent spouse and should take a larger share of the es-
tate at the expense of the spouse. '238 The two children, however, were
still treated equally. 239
The 1970s study of Illinois residents 24° asked those interviewed
what percentage of their estate they would leave to specified survivors;
the examples included minor and adult children and children by the sur-
viving spouse as well as children from other mates.241 The study showed
that where there was a minor child of the marriage, 53.3 percent of the
sample would leave the entire estate to the spouse; with an adult child,
41.2 percent would do so; where there is a minor child from a previous
marriage living at home, 18.8 percent would do so; and where there is a
minor child living with the former spouse, 16.8 percent would do So. 2 4 2
Interestingly, fewer respondents would leave the entire estate to the
surviving spouse when there are adult children, 41.2 percent, than would
do so when there are minor children, 53.3 percent. This indicates a rec-
ognition of the competing interest of the testator's children with that of
the surviving spouse and is consistent with studies supporting protection
of children when there is no surviving spouse. These percentages also
could be interpreted to mean that adult children are entitled to their
share without waiting for the surviving spouse to die and that the surviv-
ing spouse with minor children is expected to use some of the estate for
the benefit of those children.
It is also noteworthy that fewer than twenty percent would leave the
entire estate to the surviving spouse when there are children from other
unions, whether living with the decedent or the other parent. The most
popular division in these cases was approximately half to the surviving
spouse and half to the children.243 The modem trend appears to recog-
238. Id. at 1095.
239. Id.
240. Fellows, Simon, Snapp & Snapp, supra note 15.
241. The actual questions asked which are relevant to this discussion were:
1) What percentage of your estate would you wish to give each survivor if you were
survived only by your husband/wife and a minor child by your present marriage?
2) What percentage of your estate would you wish to give each survivor if you were
survived only by your husband/wife and an adult child?
3) What percentage of your estate would you wish to give each survivor if you were
survived only by your husband/wife and a minor child by a previous marriage? The
child lives with you.
4) What percentage of your estate would you wish to give each survivor if you were
survived only by your husband/wife and a minor child by a previous marriage who
lives with your former spouse?
Id. at 729.
242. Id. (Table 7).
243. Id. at 732.
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nize the divergence of interests of surviving spouses and nonbiological
children and the need to address that divergence.
In the 1977 five-state telephone survey, 244 when the respondents
were questioned about estate allocation between a surviving spouse and
children of another mate,2 45 the authors found that only twenty-three
percent gave the entire estate to the surviving spouse, compared with
58.3 percent and 51.6 percent when there were minor children or minor
and adult children by the same mate.2 46 Extrapolating from prior data,
the authors theorized that "respondents would prefer that an adult child
receive a greater share of the estate than... [that] going to the [surviving
spouse's] minor child of a prior marriage. ' '247
e. Emerging Concern for Minor Children
In a 1974-75 Morris County, New Jersey study,2 48 thirty-four per-
cent of those interviewed would give all or a larger share of the intestate
estate to the surviving spouse than is done under the intestacy laws.249
Forty-two percent, however, favored the interests of the children over
those of the spouse. "Half of this group allocated to the widow all or
part of the intestate estate but placed on her share the same restriction
that she use it primarily for the support of the children and only seconda-
rily for her own needs. ' 250 The other half of the forty-two perceht de-
clined to make an allocation but placed on the spouse's share the same
restriction that it be used primarily to support the children. Signifi-
cantly, this support obligation was not part of the survey questiorns; this
spontaneous restriction was suggested by the respondents themselves. 251
The question was modified by factors such as the age of the children
and size of the estate: when the children were fourteen and fifteen, the
only significant shift was that many of the respondents who did not allo-
cate shares between the spouse and children now did so; again, they
placed a spontaneous support limitation on the spouse's share. When the
children were twenty-four and twenty-five years of age, however, almost
seventy-five percent allocated a larger share to the spouse than the intes-
244. Fellows, Simon & Rau, supra note 173.
245. The precise question was "How would you like your property distributed if you are
survived only by your (wife/husband) and a minor child of your previous marriage who lives
with your former spouse?" Id at 366.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 367.
248. Note, Intestate Succession in New Jersey, supra note 173.
249. Id. at 268.
250. Id at 268-69.
251. Id at 273.
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tacy laws do; thirty-four percent gave the estate to the spouse outright
with no spontaneous support obligation.2 52
When the 1977 five-state telephone survey253 focused on minor- chil-
dren, respondents expressed additional concerns. Despite lawyers' con-
cerns regarding problems of guardianship and the independent legal
obligation of the surviving parent to support minor children,2 54 a signifi-
cant minority of the respondents would distribute portions of their estate
to minor children. From the explanations provided by the 34.8 percent
of the respondents who chose to give fifty percent or more of their estate
to minor children,25 5 the authors concluded that "many of these respon-
dents apparently felt that their spouses were untrustworthy. They wor-
ried about the possibility that the children might be disinherited,
especially if the surviving spouse remarried. ' 25 6 Additionally, compar-
ing the needs of the spouse with those of the minor children, those of the
children won.25 7 The answers to these questions reflect the pervasive in-
fluence of the multiple divorce and remarriage syndrome on modem
American awareness.
f. Generational Transfers
The 1965 Ohio study examined the implications of inheritance in
terms of its role in the family.25 8 The authors concluded that when testa-
tors deviated from equal distribution it was to acknowledge some special
service performed by one of the children:
Testators will their estates to designated children or other individuals
according to their perception of their needs, emotional ties with them,
and services exchanged among family members over the years. Serial
service, the transfer of worldly goods from parents to lineal descend-
ants that occurs in due course, exists side by side with serial reciproc-
ity, which specifies the giver-taker relationship based on exchanges of
goods and services and patterns of interaction. 259
The authors found that the heirs agreed generally with the testators' ap-
portionment of the estate along lines of dependence and service. Indeed,
in the small intestate estates, in which the heirs automatically received
252. Id. at 271.
253. Fellows, Simon & Rau, supra note 173.
254. Id. at 356.
255. Id. at 359 (Table 11).
256. Id. at 360.
257. Id.
258. M. SUSSMAN, J. CATES & D. SMITH, supra note 173.
259. Id. at 118. See also M. GLENDON, supra note 8, at 104.
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part of the estate by law, the heirs often willingly signed over their inter-
est to the surviving spouse.260
The relevance of inheritance in intergenerational family behavior
was illustrated best by the reaction of two adult children who had been
disinherited in favor of the testator's sister and had expressed feelings of
unfairness. Significantly, the estate was insolvent. The authors
hypothesized:
Since there was no money or property involved, it might be expected
that the heirs would have regarded the distribution indifferently. Yet
knowing that a parent has some concern and feeling is psychic income;
and evidently for some survivors, this knowledge is as valuable as real
property. Being in the thoughts of the decedent is often more impor-
tant than the amount of money involved and the actual distribution. 261
The authors concluded that inheritance plays a significant and irreplace-
able role in family continuity:
These functions (meeting the maintenance needs of family members
and symbolic identification) have relevance for the proposition that in-
heritance helps perpetuate the family through time. Although testa-
mentary freedom permits the disinheritance of immediate or distant
kin in favor of unrelated persons, this rarely occurs.... The providing
of symbolic meaning and identification cannot be achieved by society-
wide generational transfers in effect today or by those to be created in
the future. For this reason alone, there is little prospect that the inher-
itance system as we know it today will ever be abolished. 262
g. Personal Experience as a Factor
The 1970-71 English study263 differed from the other studies in that
it carved out a discrete class of interviewees and analyzed their responses
separately. Those formerly married, whether widowed, divorced, or sep-
arated, were asked questions regarding freedom of testation and inheri-
tance protection for children;264 the responses were, in some instances,
markedly different.
The views of widowed men were not very different from those of hus-
bands, but divorced or separated men were more in favour of freedom
with regard to the inclusion of children in the parent's will. Although
the majority of formerly married women preferred freedom for the
260. See supra note 231.
261. M. SUSSMAN, J. CATES & D. SMITH, supra note 173, at 148.
262. Id. at 312.
263. J. TODD & L. JONES, supra note 174.
264. For this group the precise questions were: (1) "When a married man makes a will, do
you think he should be entirely free to distribute his possessions as he wishes,-or should he be
made, by law, to include his wife in the will?" Id. at 70. (2) "When a father makes a will do
you think he should be entirely free to distribute his possessions as he wishes, or should he be
made, by law, to include all his sons and daughters in the will?" Id at 74.
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parent on this issue it was among this group that the highest propor-
tion (over a third) felt children should have an automatic inheritance
right.
All the groups were more in favour of protection through the
courts than automatic protection but the groups in which the choice of
automatic protection occurred most frequently were widows and di-
vorced or separated women.265
Thus, actual experience of separation and divorce seems to influence the
responses of those interviewed along gender lines:266 divorced and sepa-
rated men were more prone to favor testamentary freedom over protec-
tion of either spouse or children, and divorced and separated women
were more prone to favor automatic protection for children and spouses.
Those who may have had negative experiences in the analogous field of
child support payments, either in having to make them or in trying to
collect them, may have permitted those experiences to influence their
judgments in the area of inheritance. 267
In conclusion, the fact that these empirical studies of public atti-
tudes toward inheritance are at least ten years old is not a reason per se
to dismiss them. Spanning two cultures and three decades, they evince a
discernable pattern when existing societal experiences and phenomena
are accounted for. There is no conscious belief that children should be
disinherited. Earlier expectations that the surviving spouse naturally
would pass on the assets to the children have been replaced with con-
cerns for the children in the face of incompetence, remarriage, or be-
trayal by the surviving spouse. Furthermore, the higher incidence of
divorce and remarriage makes the possibility of a second surviving
spouse responsible for children from previous marriages more of a con-
sideration in the later studies than in the earlier ones268 when the expec-
tation, whether stated or assumed, was that the surviving spouse would
also be the natural or adopted parent of the children and their inheri-
tance merely would be postponed, not terminated. Finally, from the
later studies one could conclude that there is less tension between testa-
mentary freedom and the right of children to inherit than between the
265. Id. at 74-75.
266. See, e.g., id. at 70 (chart).
267. Id.
268. In 1986, of those marrying, it was the first time for 65.7% of the men and 65.8% of
the women; it was the second time for 26.6% of the men and 26.4% of the women; and it was
the third (or more) time for 7.6% of the men and 7.8% of the women. Telephone interview
with Barbara Wilson, United States Dept. of Health and Human Services, National Center for
Health Statistics (Dec. 1989).
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proper allocation of assets among survivors, especially when the size of
the estate is small.
III. Testamentary Freedom Balanced Against Other Interests
The preceding analysis examined the historic reasons for favoring
testamentary freedom over the interests of children and suggested that
these reasons are no longer persuasive. Indeed, when testamentary free-
dom has been in tension with other legal interests, the law has balanced
the tension in favor of those other interests.
A. Obligations of Estate Administration and Testamentary Freedom
There are temporary familial obligations, enumerated and protected
by statute in the various states, as well as expenses of estate administra-
tion, that must be satisfied before final disposition of property under the
will.2 69 These include the "family allowance, ' 270 the "homestead allow-
ance, ' 271 and the "exempt property allowance. '272 These obligations re-
269. See, e.g., Estate of Thelma Owens, N.Y.L.J., May 23, 1988, at 23, col. 3 (Totten
Trusts, which are non-estate assets that pass money to the beneficiary without a will, were
invaded to pay medical, administration, and funeral expenses of the decedent when the estate
assets were not sufficient). The Uniform Probate Code extends this protection to creditors and
statutory allowances such as the family or widow's allowance, homestead allowance, and ex-
empt property allowance. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 6-107 (1969).
270. The family allowance "[c]onsists of a certain amount of decedent's property allocated
for the support of the widow and children during the period of estate administration."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 544 (5th ed. 1979). It is similar to the "widow's allowance." See
Id. at 1433. Professor Glendon considers "family allowance" or "widow's allowance" statutes
as "significant protection against disinheritance in the neediest families" due to the fact that
where the allowances exist, the court may deplete the personal property of the estate to meet
the support requirements of the surviving spouse and children, but only during the period of
probate or administration of the estate. Glendon, Fixed Rules and Discretion in Contemporary
Family Law and Succession Law, 60 TUL. L. REV. 1165, 1189 (1986).
271. The homestead allowance generally frees certain real property from the claim of cred-
itors, either permanently or during the period of the surviving spouse's life and the minority of
the children. "[I]n most states, legislation has assured the surviving members of the family the
enjoyment of the home place against both the testamentary caprices of the husband and the
demands of his creditors." T. ATKINSON, supra note 109, at 127-28 (footnote omitted).
272. Some states carry over the personal property exemption from creditors that the dece-
dent had in life to specific articles for the benefit of the family at the decedent's death:
Laws which are primarily motivated by this consideration are apt to set aside to the
widow or to the family the deceased's clothing, furniture, supplies, tools, implements,
animals and the like of a specific number or value. The injustice which may result to
creditors is generally slight compared with the benefit received by the family. How-
ever, many of such provisions are obsolete with regard to the sort of property desig-
nated. The more modern type of statute exempts a specified amount of money or
goods of a certain value.
Id. at 129 (footnotes omitted). Often the family Bible was included in the exempted items.
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fiect a public policy determination that certain familial assets and
obligations have priority over the wishes of the testator. 273
B. The Sovereign and Testamentary Freedom
There are certain obligations that the estate must satisfy before or in
spite of any testamentary dispositions. The sovereign taxing authorities
have a claim to estate assets superior to the wishes of the testator. Taxes
payable out of the assets of the estate may include personal federal in-
come taxes of the decedent,274 federal estate taxes, 275 and federal gift
taxes.276 Likewise, states have superior claims for state income taxes as
well as state inheritance or estate taxes. 277 In addition, there may be
state gift taxes for which the estate is liable. Any outstanding property
tax also comes out of the estate assets.278
The general order of payment of estate obligations is the family al-
lowance, funeral expenses, medical expenses during last illness, costs of
estate administration, federal taxes, and finally state taxes. 279 After these
obligations are met the estate is then liable for the debts of the decedent,
again before distribution of estate assets in accordance with the will.
C. Creditors' Rights and Testamentary Freedom
As early as 1805, Chief Justice Marshall made clear that although
creditors should pursue executors first, they then could pursue devisees
273. The Uniform Probate Code, for example, states in pertinent part:
The power of a person to leave property by will and the rights of creditors, devisees,
and heirs to his property are subject to ... this Code to facilitate the prompt settle-
ment of estates. Upon the death of a person, his real and personal.property devolves
to the persons to whom it is devised by his last will.., or in the absence of testamen-
tary disposition, to his heirs ... subject to homestead allowance, exempt property
and family allowance, to rights of creditors, elective share of the surviving spouse,
and to administration.
UNIF. PROB. CODE § 3-101 (1969).
274. T. ATKINSON, supra note 109, at 680.
275. Id. at 681. Currently, if the gross estate is $600,000 or more, federal estate taxes
would be due.
276. Id.
277. Id. at 681-82.
278. Id. at 682.
279. Id. at 708-10. Professor Atkinson notes other priority obligations that may exist by
statute in a particular jurisdiction: certain trust beneficiaries, judgment debts obtained during
decedent's lifetime, and wages and rent have priority over secured and unsecured debts of the
decedent, but these all have priority over disposition of assets in accordance with the will. Id.
at 710-12. The Uniform Probate Code recognizes certain statutory allowances: the homestead
allowance, UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-401 (1969); the family allowance or widow's allowance, id.
§ 2-403; and the exempt property allowance, id. § 2-402.
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and legatees to' satisfy debts of the de'cedent. 280 While it is true that a
testator may designate which assets of the estate are to be used to satisfy
the debts, a "testator cannot, by his will, withdraw from his creditors any
property which the law subjects to their claims. ' 281 Both real and per-
sonal property are subject to the decedent's debts.282
Today, under the Uniform Probate Code,28 3 "claims" against the
decedent's estate exclude estate or inheritance taxes, but include "liabili-
ties of the decedent... whether arising in contract, in tort or otherwise,
and liabilities of the estate which arise at or after the death of the dece-
dent or after the appointment of a conservator, including funeral ex-
penses and expenses of administration. '28 4 Creditors must assert their
claims in a timely manner28 5 to the personal representative of the dece-
dent's estate. If their claims are not barred,28 6 however, creditors can
enforce their claims against the distributees 'even after distribution of the
estate.287
Many jurisdictions that have not enacted the Uniform Probate Code
have similar estate obligations and creditor protections.288 For example,
Article 12 of New York's Estates Powers and Trust Law (EPTL) is
designed to make available to creditors and other persons with claims
against the estate of a decedent an action against beneficiaries under
the decedent's will or intestate distributees to whom the real or per-
sonal property of the decedent has been distributed-whenever pro-
ceedings in the surrogate's court or an action against the personal
representative to reach estate assets are no longer available.289
280. Milligan v. Milledge, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 220, 228 (1805).
281. Potter v. Gardner, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 498, 501 (1827).
282. Bank of United States v. Beverly, 42 U.S. (1 How.) 134, 149-50 (1843); Potter, 25 U.S.
(12 Wheat.) at 501.
283. Adopted, approved, or adapted in approximately 14 states by 1985. AM. JUR. 2D
Desk Book Item No. 124, at 205 (Supp. 1989).
284. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 1-201(4) (1969).
285. Failure to assert the claim timely (four months after publication of first notice by
personal representative; within three years of death, if no publication) will bar the claim
against both the personal representative and the distributees of the estate. Id. § 3-803.
286. Creditors present claims to the personal representative who either allows or disallows
them. The personal representative notifies the claimant of the action taken; failure to notify is
an allowance of the claim. If the claim is disallowed by the representative, the creditor must
file a petition of allowance with the probate court or bring an action against the representative
within 60 days of disallowance or the claim is barred. Id § 3-806.
287. Id § 3-104.
288. See generally T. ATKINSON, supra note 109. New York, for example, provides sub-
stantial protection for creditors in its comprehensive statutory estate disposition plan. See N.Y.
SURR. CT. PROC. AcT LAW §§ 1801-1814 (McKinney 1967 & Supp. 1989); N.Y. EST. POW-
ERS & TRUSTS LAW §§ 12-1.1 to -2.5 (McKinney 1981 & Supp. 1989).
289. Memorandum of Commission on Law of Estates on the Estates, Powers and' Trusts
Law, in 17B MCKINNEY'S CONSOLIDATED LAWS OF NEW YORK ANNOTATED liii-liv (1981).
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Thus, in resolving the tension between testamentary freedom and the in-
terests of creditors and other obligations of the testator, public policy
consistently has dictated that the short-term emergency needs of the
spouse and children,290 the exigencies of the burial of the decedent, the
administration of the estate, the decedent's tax obligations, and claims of
the decedent's creditors be satisfied before distribution of the remaining
estate may proceed according to the testator's wishes.
D. Spousal Elective Share
In the majority of states, public policy has resolved the tension be-
tween testamentary freedom and the mutual spousal obligation of sup-
port against testamentary freedom. The type of protections afforded
surviving spouses range from life estate interests in part of the decedent's
estate to the intestate share of the estate.291
290. See supra notes 269-73 and accompanying text.
291. See ALA. CODE § 43-9-70 (1982) (the lesser of one-third or all minus value of surviv-
ing spouse's separate estate); ALASKA STAT. § 13.11.070(a) (1985) (one-third of augmented
estate); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2310A (1975) (same as intestate share unless transfer
outside of will or intentionally omitted); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 28-39-401 (1987) (after one year
of marriage, women get dower in real estate and personalty as if intestate, plus homestead; men
get curtsey in same); CAL. PROB. CODE § 6560 (Deering 1990) (one-half community property,
separate property); COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-11-201(1) (1987) (one-half augmented estate);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-273a(a) (West 1981 & Supp. 1990) (one-third estate for life);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 901 (1987) (one-third elective estate less amount of all transfers to
the surviving spouse by decedent); D.C. CODE ANN. § 19-113 (1989) (intestate share including
dower rights not to exceed one-half of estate); FLA. STAT. § 732.207 (West 1976) (30% of all
assets); HAW. REV. STAT. § 560:2-201 (1988) (one-third of net estate); IDAHO CODE § 15-2-
203(a) (1979) (one-half of total augmented quasi-community property estate); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 110 1/2, para. 2-8 (Smith-Hurd 1978) (one-third of estate if decedent has a descen-
dant; one-half of estate if no descendant); IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-3-1 (West Supp. 1989) (one-
half of estate but if survivor is subsequent spouse without children and the decedent has de-
scendants, one-third of net personal estate and life estate in one-third of testator's lands);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 633.238 (West 1964) (one-third estate in real property; all personal prop-
erty); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-603 (1983) (intestate share); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 392.080
(Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1984) (intestate share for personal property; one-third of real estate
seized in fee simple at the decedent's death in the decedent or for the decedent's use); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 2-201(a) (1981) (one-third of augmented estate); MD. EST. &
TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 3-208 (1974) (intestate share); MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 191, § 15
(West 1990) (one-third of personal and real property if decedent left issue; $25,000 plus income
from trust of one-half of remaining property if decedent left kindred but no issue but only
$25,000 outright-spouse receives income from trust for remaining amount; $25,000 plus one-
half of remaining property absolute if no kindred or issue); MIcH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 700.282 (West Supp. 1990) (one-half of all property less one-half of value of all property
derived from decedent by means other than testate or intestate succession); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 524.2-201 (West Supp. 1990) (one-third of augmented estate); MISS. CODE ANN. § 91-5-25
(1989) (intestate share but only one-half of real or personal estate); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 474.160
(Vernon Supp. 1989) (one-half estate if no lineal descendants; one-third if there are lineal de-
scendants); MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-2-702 (1987) (one-third of augmented estate); NEB. REV.
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New York's statutory elective share for the surviving spouse is illus-
trative. New York passed the statutory elective share to eliminate "the
glaring inconsistency... which compels a man to support his wife during
his lifetime and permits him to leave her practically penniless at his
death. ' 292 As originally enacted in New York in 1929, the spousal elec-
tive share guaranteed "the surviving spouse a definite portion of the es-
tate regardless of its size, the decedent's other responsibilities, the needs
and resources of the surviving spouse, or any non-testamentary provi-
sions the decedent made in his or her favor. '293 In the 1960s the Bennett
Commission, which further revised New York's estates law, noted that
thirty-three states plus the District of Columbia had adopted elective
share laws.294 In summarizing the resultant protections for surviving
spouses, the commission concluded:
STAT. § 30-2313 (1989) (up to one-half of augmented estate); NEv. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 123.250 (Michie 1986) (community property rights only; no election); N.H. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 560:10 (1974) (if there are children, one-third of personalty and real estate; if no chil-
dren but parent or sibling, $10,000 personalty, $10,000 real estate, and one-half remainder; if
no children, parents, or siblings, $10,000 plus $2000 for every year of marriage plus one-half of
remainder); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:8-1 (1983) (one-third of augmented estate); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 45-2-102 (1978) (community property only; no elective share); N.Y. EST. POWERS &
TRUSTS LAW § 5-1.1(c)(B) (McKinney 1981) (one-third of estate if issue;
one-half if no issue); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 30-3 (1984) (intestate share, but if no children then
one-half of estate; if children or descendants of a previous marriage, one-half intestate succes-
sion); N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-05-01 (1975) (one-third of augmented estate); OHIO REv.
CODE ANN. § 2107.39 (Anderson 1989) (one-third of estate if decedent, is survived by two or
more children or lineal descendants; one-half otherwise); OLKA. STAT. ANN. tit. 84, § 44
(West. Supp. 1990) (intestate share); OR. REV. STAT. § 114.105 (1984) (one-fourth of net es-
tate); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2303(a) (Purdon 1989) (one-third of probate estate); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 33-6-21 to -22 (1984) (dower and curtesy); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 62-2-201 to -207
(LAW. CO-OP 1986) (one-third of estate); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 30-20-1, 30-20-16 to -
19, 30-5A-1 to -8 (1984) (both will provisions and homestead rights unless will requires elec-
tion); TENN. CODE ANN. § 31-4-101 (Supp. 1989) (one-third of estate); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 75-2-201 (Supp. 1989) (one-third of augmented estate); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14,§§ 461-475
(1989) (dower or curtesy or will); VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-16 (1987) (one-third of estate surplus
if there are children; one-half of estate surplus if no children); W. VA. CODE § 42-3-1 (1982)
(share spouse would have taken had decedent died intestate with children); WIS. STAT. ANN.§§ 861.01-.03 (West Supp. 1989) (one-half deferred and augmented marital property); Wyo.
STAT. § 2-5-101 (1980) (one-half of estate if no issue or spouse is parent of only issue of dece-
dent; one-fourth if spouse is non-parent of issue). Several states do not have elective share
statutes, including Georgia, Louisiana (community property; see LA: CIV. CODE ANN. art. 889
(West Supp. 1990)), and Texas (spouse can take community property at common law).
292. THIRD REPORT ON ESTATES, supra note 7, at 191,(quoting the 1929 Foley Decedent
Estate Commission, which recommended the 1929 legislation creating the elective share for
spouses). It is interesting to note the almost identical language used to describe the plight of
children by the 1929 Foley Decedent Estate Commission. See infra note 315 and accompany-
ing text.
293. THIRD REPORT ON ESTATES, supra note 7, at 191-92.
294. Id. at 206.
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In nearly all of the other states having a right of election, the surviving
spouse can in all events take the intestate share or some portion or
fraction thereof no matter what provisions the decedent has made in
the will in lieu thereof. Thus, with very few exceptions, no matter how
large the estate may be or how inexperienced the surviving spouse is in
money matters, or what independent assets the surviving spouse has,
he or she is guaranteed as a minimum, the intestate share.
295
In creating the spousal elective share, the state has interfered with
testamentary freedom to protect the surviving spouse against the wishes
of the testator for reasons of public policy. The public policies include
preventing the spouse from becoming a ward of the state and recognizing
the contributions, economic or otherwise, the spouse made toward the
acquisition of the decedent's estate.29 6 The ward of the state concerns are
even more compelling for dependent children. While contributions of
the child toward acquisition of the family assets are of a more indirect
and different nature, the status of the child in the family may suggest a
claim to those assets even when dependence is not a factor.
297
E. Parental Responsibility for Financial Support of Dependent Children
The foregoing tensions between testamentary freedom and other
public policies all have been resolved in favor of the other interests. This
Article suggests that the time has come to resolve yet another tension:
parental responsibility for child support and testamentary freedom. As
proposed herein, child support, just as creditor's rights, taxes, and
spousal support have been, would be the victor.
Children historically have had a surfeit of control, protection, gui-
dance, and restrictions from the dual sovereignty of parents and state.
2 98
295. Id. at 207. In New York, unlike the other 33 states that have the spousal elective
share, the testator can prevent the spouse from claiming the elective share by creating trusts
for the benefit of the surviving spouse that are equal in value to the elective share. Id. at 193-
96, 207.
296. See, e.g., id. at 212.
297. See infra notes 366-367 and accompanying text.
298. The American people have always regarded education and the acquisition of
knowledge as matters of supreme importance which should be diligently promoted.
The Ordinance of 1787 declares, "Religion, morality, and knowledge being necessary
to good government and the happiness of mankind, schools and the means of educa-
tion shall forever be encouraged." Corresponding to the right of control, it is the
natural duty of the parent to give his children education suitable to their station in
life, and nearly all the States, including Nebraska, enforce this obligation by compul-
sory laws.
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1922).
In the same case, however, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that "[t]he power of the State to
compel attendance at some school and to make reasonable regulations for all schools, includ-
ing a requirement that they shall give instructions in English, is not questioned." Id. at 402.
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Which sovereign should control on particular children's issues, however,
often was unclear: "It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and
nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function
and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither
supply nor hinder."299 This historic tension between the family response
and the law,3°° coupled with the traditional emphasis on the testator's
side of the inheritance coin,301 has, except in Louisiana, created a vac-
uum in protecting the right of children to inherit.
Yet this same reticence on the part of the state to wrest familial
control from the family has existed in all family issues. Modem flexible
approaches have been found to balance the competing considerations.
An examination of some of these issues and the solutions conceived and
employed is useful.
(1) Living Parents
The historic moral obligation of the father to support his children
has evolved into the integrated legal and moral obligation of both parents
to support their children.3 02 This integration has not, however, dimin-
ished the force of the moral component.30 3 The obligation extends to all
This duality of sovereign responsibilities seen here in education occurs in other areas in which
the family response and the law is in tension.
299. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944). The Prince court also referred to
the "private realm of family life which the state cannot enter." Id Cf M.(GLENDON, supra
note 8, at 117 (although social welfare programs are well established and accepted, families
still play crucial support roles, particularly in such areas as child support after a divorce);
Hafen, supra note 1, at 869-78 (documenting a "natural swaying of the historical pendulum...
between an emphasis on the private sphere and an emphasis on the larger social sphere");
Teitelbaum, supra note 29, at 812-13 (a "shrinking" of family functions occurred in the 19th
and 20th centuries because courts and legislatures determined that public agencies were better
able to educate, control, and provide for children).
300. For example, while acknowledging that "[n]o one would seriously dispute that a
deeply loving and interdependent relationship between an adult and a child in his or her care
may exist even in the absence of a blood relationship," the Supreme Court nevertheless ac-
knowledged "important distinctions between the foster family and the natural family." Smith
v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 844-45 (1977). When the foster family exists
because of "positive-law sources" the Court will assess the family liberty interest alleged, not
from the familial liberty interest in a "right to family privacy in the integrity of their family
unit," but from state-law-created "expectations and entitlements of the parties." See id. at
842-46. See also supra notes 30-32.
301. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
302. "At common law, a father is bound to support his legitimate children, and the obliga-
tion continues during their minority. We may assume this obligation to exist in all the States."
Dunbar v. Dunbar, 190 U.S. 340, 351 (1903). See also M. GLENDON, supra note 8, at 68-69;
Glendon, supra note 270, at 1173.
303. See, eg., Parnas & Cermak, Rethinking Child Support, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 759,
795 (1989).
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children of the parent, whether in or out of wedlock or from current or
prior marriages. 30 4 This fundamental responsibility for financial support
of children, however, must adapt to the realities of the limited resources
available to the supporting parent. Thus, despite the recognized primary
obligation of a parent for support of a child, the state must intervene
when the parent's resources are deficient.30 5
Nonsupport can exist in intact families as well as in divorced fami-
lies. Nonsupport by a parent still living at home with the child presuma-
bly would be based on an inability to support rather than on a refusal to
support. In post-divorce support cases, however, while there may be an
inability to make support payments, often there are other complicating,
residual factors from the dissolution of the marriage such as blame, guilt,
or bitterness, which result in nonsupport even though the means are
available.306 Direct involvement of the state through enforcement pro-
ceedings and court orders are much more prevalent in post-divorce non-
support proceedings. 30 7
Despite this legal standoff, courts and commentators have been im-
aginative in forging solutions when adequate support of children is the
goal. As one authority has stated:
A 'children first' principle should govern all such divorces [couples
with minor children]. Implicit in the existing law of child support is
that having children engages all of the parents' income and property to
304. See, e.g., Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 538 (1972).
305. The establishment of the federal Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)
program is a good example of governmental intervention. To qualify for federal assistance, a
child must be deprived of a parent. In King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968), Alabama at-
tempted to deny assistance to families with "substitute fathers" who have no biological relation
to child or duty to support, but live with the mother. Id. at 313-14. Alabama claimed this was
"a legitimate way of allocating its limited resources available for AFDC assistance" as well as
discouraging "illicit sexual relationships and illegitimate births" and equalizing informal mari-
tal relationships with formal ones that would be ineligible for AFDC funds. Id. at 318.
In striking down Alabama's substitute father statute, the Supreme Court noted that the
state had other means to discourage immoral behavior and that by subsequent amendments to
the Social Security Act, Congress made clear "that destitute children who are legally fatherless
cannot be flatly denied federally funded assistance on the transparent fiction that they have a
substitute father." Id. at 334. Cf M. GLENDON, supra note 8, at 74, 219. Furthermore, even
judicial preference for supporting prior families is dissipated when it confronts enforcement
attempts. Id. at 72, 74.
306. See, e.g., Parnas & Cermak, supra note 303, at 764. See also Rice v. Andrews, 127
Misc. 826, 217 N.Y.S. 528 (1926) (testator disinherited his seven-year-old son for no reason
other than the father's bitter relationship with the mother).
307. See, e.g., M. GLENDON, supra note 8, at 11; Teitelbaum, supra note 127, at 1145.
Studies on the effect of remarriage on support payments interestingly enough show either no
effect or a positive effect. When additional children result from these new liaisons, however, it
often led to reduced support payments to the prior family. Parnas & Cermak, supra note 303,
at 766.
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the extent necessary to provide decent subsistence for the children at
least until they reach their majority. Consistent application of this
principle in divorces involving minor children would mean that, in
these cases, the judge's main job would be to design the best possible
package of property, income and in kind personal care to meet the
needs of the new family unit composed of the children and their custo-
dian.... All property, no matter when or how acquired, would be
subject to the duty to provide for the children. Nor would there be any
question of 'spousal support' as distinct from that allocated to the cus-
todial spouse in his or her capacity as custodian.
3 08
Other commentators note "creative mechanisms" employed "to locate
defaulters, discover tax returns, intercept tax refunds and other pay-
ments, garnish and redirect wages and attach property. '30 9
The federal government plays a role in helping locate and enforce
obligations of child support defaulters. In 1987, there were 2.9 million
non-AFDC child support enforcement cases and 7.6 million AFDC and
AFDC arrears cases. 310 The federal Child Support Enforcement Pro-
gram311 collected almost 3.9 billion dollars, of which over 2.5 billion dol-
lars was for non-AFDC families. 312 These collections, however, were for
only 31.7 percent of the non-AFDC cases, 10.7 percent of the AFDC
cases, and 10.6 percent of the AFDC arrears cases. 313 These attempts to
balance the public interest in parental responsibility for support of chil-
dren against the realities of inability to pay or indifference suggest an
approach to finding the appropriate balance between testamentary free-
dom and the right of children to inherit.
308. Glendon, supra note 270, at 1173-74. Professor Glendon cautions that this judicial
practice must have "subsidiary guidelines" in order to incorporate the effect of subsequent
liaisons, choose the appropriate standard of living by which to measure the support, and gauge
the proper allocation of support from the parents. Id. at 1175-76. Most importantly, these
subsidiary guidelines should be statutory: "The judge's role should be to adapt the principles,
not to invent them for each new situation." Id at 1176.
309. Parnas & Cermak, supra note 303, at 759-60.
310. STATSTICAL ABsTRAcT OF THE UNrrED STATES, supra note 11, at 369 (Chart 610).
311. A note in the Statistical Abstract describes the Child Support Enforcement Program:
The Child Support Enforcement Program locates absent parents, establishes pater-
nity of children born out of wedlock, and establishes and enforces support orders. By
law, these services are available to all families that need them. The program is oper-
ated at the State and local government level but 68% of administrative costs are paid
by the Federal government. Child support collected for families not receiving Aid to
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) goes to the family to help it remain self-
sufficient. Most of the child support collected on behalf of AFDC families goes to
Federal and State governments to offset AFDC payments.
Id.
312. Id.
313. Id.
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(2) Deceased Parents
While the foregoing discussion is illustrative of the historic, deeply
rooted moral and legal obligation of support owed to children by their
parents that is in tension with modem financial realities, it also highlights
an inexplicable statutory and judicial concession to testamentary free-
dom. Despite the recognized compelling interest of parental support of
children, "there is apparently no [American] jurisdiction where a depen-
dent child may not be disinherited by a parent who makes his desire to
disinherit the child sufficiently clear."'314
Recognition of the tension between morality and law in this area
was evident to New York's Foley Commission in 1929:
The Commission has left to be considered by others whether a parent
has a moral duty, which should be made a legal duty, to provide for
the support and maintenance of children during the period of their
dependence. Should the law compel a parent at death to provide for
his helpless dependents? The right of a testator to pauperize his help-
less dependents now exists under our law. When will the State step in
to take away that privilege? When will such public policy be changed?
The State is vitally interested in the care of minor children from both a
pecuniary and a social viewpoint. 3 15
The illogic at work when testamentary freedom remains victorious
over the fundamental need of dependent children for parental support
has been aptly pointed out.316 Testamentary freedom has bowed to cred-
itors' rights, the "whole panoply of property, income, excise, gift and
death taxes, ' 317 and, of course, the spousal elective share. It is now time
for testamentary freedom to defer as well to the inheritance rights of
children. 318
314. Rein, supra note 13, at 12. See also supra note 3 and accompanying text. Aside from
halfhearted end-runs made at testamentary freedom on behalf of children by the various
pretermitted child statutes, there are no current statutory safeguards for children. See, e.g.,
Cahn, supra note 15; Rein, supra note 13, at 37. These statutes seek to protect the afterborn
child or the child inadvertently left out of the will, increasingly rare actual occurrences. When
used by the courts in an attempt to protect disinherited children, they are ineffective. Rein,
supra note 13, at 37.
315. FOURTH REPORT ON ESTATES, supra note 15, at 198 n.23. The Foley Commission
was the predecessor commission to the Bennett Commission in the 1960s.
316. See Rein, supra note 13, at 12-22.
317. Id. at 18-19 (quoting the Foley Commission).
318. In 1965, the New York Bennett Commission commented: "[Tihe continued com-
plete freedom of the New York testator to disinherit his dependent children appears to reflect
an indifference to moral and social irresponsibility and is certainly out of harmony with the
vast social legislation which has characterized the last half century in this State and Country."
FOURTH REPORT ON ESTATES, supra note 15, at 197. The Bennett Commission proposed a
modified family maintenance system for New York, but this was not enacted by the Legisla-
ture. See id. at 198-201.
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IV. The Concept of Protected Inheritance
The term "protected inheritance" as used in this Article describes
the proposed right of children to inherit from their parents despite any
will of their parents to the contrary. Protected inheritance is distinguish-
able from the general concept of inheritance whereby the possessions of
the deceased may, but need not, devolve on the heirs of the deceased
either by operation of the deceased's will or by the dictates of the law of
intestacy.
Looking at the question from the child's rather than the testator's
perspective, inheritance is separated from the concept of property, at
least temporarily, and clearly wedded to the concept of family. The
child's expectation, right, or interest in the asset is based not on owner-
ship, but rather on relationship to the owner. Protected inheritance is
substantively similar to the legitim or forced heirship found in civil law
countries and in Louisiana today. Conceptually and quantitatively, how-
ever, it is distinguishable. As a term of art, "protected inheritance" em-
phasizes the positive effect on the "tails" side of the coin, while the term
"forced heirship" merely describes a negative impact on the "heads" side
of the coin. Furthermore, protected heirship recognizes and addresses
the fact that there may be differences in need among the lineal descend-
ants of a testator.
A. Protected Inheritance: The Proposal
This proposal is not a ceiling, but a floor. The suggested protection
here is for those who do not conform to the minimum societal expecta-
tion of providing for their children, yet have the means to do so. The
tension between the family response and the current law calls for the law
to provide protection to children that the majority of the population
would find morally compelling. This floor of obligation does not affect
those who have no assets. It does not prevent the majority of those who
recognize their responsibilities to their children from continuing to leave
assets above and beyond the minimum suggested here.
A simple yet comprehensive plan that acknowledges the tradition of
testamentary freedom when possible, introduces an automatic protection
of some degree for all children, is sensitive to need, and statutorily recog-
nizes the family response, would be ideal.319 Neither modem forced heir-
319. Professor Paul Haskell earlier had proposed an excellent and comprehensive scheme
of a similar nature. See Haskell, supra note 3, at 518-26.
Professor Haskell proposed a basic forced share of one-third of the first $200,000 of the
estate for all childen, regardless of age; and then, on top of that, a supplemental amount equal
to the original share for each child under 21 years of age, or through 26 years of age if engaged
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ship nor a family maintenance system is the answer. Family
maintenance is inappropriate: "Because the Anglo-American procedural
tradition is preoccupied with adversarial and litigational values, the deci-
sion to organize any function as a judicial proceeding is inconsistent with
the interests that ordinary people regard as paramount when they think
about the transmission of their property at death: dispatch, simplicity,
inexpensiveness, privacy. ' ' 320  Modem forced heirship is inappropriate
because it does not recognize the difference between minor dependent
children, the parental obligation of support, and the general family re-
in full-time education. For children in this category, their basic and supplemental forced
shares are placed in trust and the income paid until the child is 21 or completes formal educa-
tion. "Upon termination of the trust, the basic forced share shall be distributed outright to the
child, and the supplemental forced share shall be disposed of in accordance with the terms of
the decedent's will." Id. at 519.
Payment of the basic forced share to adult children is deferred until all children have
reached majority or 26 years of age, and the adult children's basic forced share is added to the
supplemental trusts for minor children. That basic share corpus, however, would not be in-
vaded for support of the minor children. Id. at 520.
For smaller estates, Professor Haskell proposes that one-third of the estate be a basic
forced share when there is no surviving spouse and two-thirds when there is both a surviving
spouse and children; the balance is "freely disposable," subject only to the requirements of the
supplemental trust, if any. Id. at 522.
His proposal for the surviving spouse is analogous to the elective share found in most
jurisdictions today, except his is a minimum share: if the current state law gives more, Profes-
sor Haskell defers to that amount. Id. at 520.
Additionally, Professor Haskell has a forced share for needy parents of the decedent.
Need is to be determined by the courts. If there is not enough in the estate to meet all forced
share demands, Professor Haskell would have the needy parents wait until the trust for minor
children is no longer needed and the basic forced share distribution is made to all children. The
proceeds of the trust for minors then would be available to maintain the needy parents. Id. at
520-21.
The New York Commission on Estates reviewed Professor Haskell's proposal when it
considered legislation to protect children in 1962-65. The Committee felt, however, that Pro-
fessor Haskell's proposal would "seriously interfere with freedom of alienation and estate plan-
ning" and was not based on need. They preferred a family maintenance system model.
Nothing was adopted by the New York Legislature. FOURTH REPORT ON ESTATES, supra
note 15, at 191.
The proposal herein differs from Professor Haskell's in several respects: first, regardless
of the size of the estate, one-half of the intestate share allocated to children is used; next,
recognizing the support obligations of both parents for their children, the elective or intestate
share of the surviving spouse would be used to contribute to the children's share; furthermore,
the share of adult children may be lost entirely if the needs of the minor and dependent chil-
dren require it; and finally, protected inheritance would permit exhaustion of principal from
nonfamily legatees before exhaustion of that of family members if necessary to support minor
and dependent children. Assets comprising the estate for purposes of calculation differ as well.
320. Langbein, The Nonprobate Revolution and the Future of the Law of Succession, 97
HARV. L. REV. 1108, 1116 (1984) (discussing the shrinking role of the probate process in
transferring wealth at death).
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sponse claim of all children regardless of age. With limited assets, this
difference could be crucial.
Protected inheritance recognizes the need of minor children and the
family response claim of all children; simplicity of application recom-
mends it. Under protected inheritance, one-half of the children's intes-
tate share of the decedent's estate automatically would be subject to this
plan whenever the decedent is survived by children. Protected inheri-
tance thus is preferable to the procedural complexities of a family main-
tenance system3 21 in which need and dependence are the only criteria for
judicial intervention and litigation is the required procedure to seek an
adjustment.
(1) Description: Mechanics and Details
Simply put, when there are surviving minor or dependent children,
their needs must be met before the surviving spouse, adult children, other
kin and dependents, and nonfamilial devisees are provided for by the de-
cedent. 322 When there is one or more children of any age, one-half of the
intestate share of the estate for children automatically would be subject
to the protected inheritance plan. Since the needs323 of dependent and
minor children 324 would be satisfied first out of this share, it is possible
that adult children Would receive very few assets. If there is money left
out of this share when all children finally are emancipated, all of the
children would be entitled to share in the remaining assets equally.
The operative theory is that the adult children already benefited
from the assets of the decedent while growing up and being educated.
The protected share assures minor and dependent children the same fi-
nancial support that the decedent already has given the adult child.
Once that has been accomplished, the other purpose of the protected
share-formal recognition of the familial bonds to the decedent-re-
quires that all children share the remainder of the estate.
321. The need to activate protection only through litigation and to have no established
boundaries but the discretion of the court prevents testators who would honor a floor in their
will from doing so, guarantees litigation expenses devouring estate assets, and wastes time in
providing for the minor child.
322. Cf Glendon, supra note 270, at 1173-74.
323. Just as Professor Haskell proposed, the "needs" of minor and dependent children
would have an expanded, 1990s definition that transcends mere survival and subsistence and
includes higher, full-time education directed toward emancipating an adult truly capable of
self-support.
324. Minor children would be those under the age of 18 or 21, depending on the particular
jurisdiction. Dependent children are those, regardless of age or formal court adjudication of
status, who are not able to support themselves or who, while beyond the age of majority,
nevertheless are pursuing full-time education.
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Assume an estate of 300,000 dollars with a surviving spouse who is
also the biological mother of the decedent's three children, aged fifteen,
twenty-two, and thirty,325 in a jurisdiction in which the intestate share is
two-thirds for children. Half of the intestate share, or 100,000 dollars,
would be the protected share for the children. There would not, how-
ever, be an immediate equal payout of that amount to the three children;
all of it would go into a trust account.
Moreover, since there is an equal obligation on both parents to sup-
port their children, the spousal elective or intestate share of one-third, or
100,000 dollars, also would make a contribution to this trust account. 326
Finally, the 100,000 dollars from the residual estate (that portion of the
estate available for the exercise of testamentary freedom) also would be
added to this trust.327
The income from the entire amount of the trust would be applied to
the support and education of the minor dependents until majority or
completion of education pursued full time, whichever occurred later. If
income alone is adequate to meet the needs of the minor dependent, the
corpus would be paid out at majority or emancipation according to the
interests of the contributors: equal shares to all now emancipated chil-
dren, then the return of the spousal contribution, and the return of the
nonfamilial or other devisee contributions. If income alone is not suffi-
cient to support and educate the minor dependent, the principal of the
various shares making up the trust would be invaded only as necessary in
the following order: The corpus of the shares of the minor dependent,
that of the nonfamilial devisees, that of the adult children, then finally,
that of the surviving spouse.
The order of ability to invade the principal of the various contribu-
tions is consistent with the obligations of the decedent to the family and
the priority of claims of the various beneficiaries on the estate. The
corpus of the children directly benefiting from the protected share logi-
325. If the 22-year-old is not pursuing full-time education, the 22-year-old and 30-year-old
are considered adults; if the 22-year-old is pursuing full-time education, then the 15-year-old
and 22-year-old are considered dependent minors.
326. The amount would be one-half of either one-third (15-year-old) or two-thirds (15-
and 22-year old), that is, $16,500 or $33,000.
327. In this example, the residuary estate would be $100,000, which the testator would be
free to leave to whomever he pleases if there were no minor children. Since there is either one
or two minor children depending on the status of the 22-year-old, however, that $100,000
cannot be distributed immediately to the legatees. It will be added to the trust in its entirety,
as opposed to the partial contribution to the trust by the surviving spouse, and eventually will
be distributed to the designated legatees only when all children reach majority, if in the interim
the principal has not been consumed in meeting the requirements of the minor child or
children.
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cally is consumed first. The nonfamilial devisees, however, have no di-
rect claim on the decedent that society would recognize as superior to the
decedent's obligations to his family; their corpus, therefore, would be in-
vaded if necessary.
Next, since the adult children already have benefited from being
raised by the decedent and the assets are being consumed to give siblings
equivalent benefits, it is appropriate for their share to be used to help
their family if necessary. It is the familial relationship, after all, that
gives them the right to this protected share, if there are assets-left to pay
out; so it is the familial relationship that calls upon them to help out their
siblings.3 28
Finally, the corpus of the contribution of the surviving spouse is the
last resource consumed for the minor dependent children. This recog-
nizes both the parental obligation to support the children and the spousal
obligation of mutual support.
When the surviving spouse is not the biological parent of some or all
of the decedent's children, the same principle still applies. That is, the
surviving spouse would still have to contribute half of the spousal elective
or intestate share to the support and education of the minor or dependent
children. 329 That corpus would be invaded, albeit as a last resort, to sup-
port and educate the minor dependent children.
This requirement is equitable because it recognizes and fulfills at
death the parental obligations to all the children of the decedent, even as
courts are becoming increasingly frustrated in attempts to enforce sup-
port obligations of parents for both current and prior families. 330 This
also would establish the parental support obligation as an equal priority
with the spousal support obligation, a societal position not so inequitable
in light of the relative positions of the spouse and the children. 331
Moreover, since these are spouses of subsequent marriages, the
much greater likelihood is that any children who do fall into the minor
dependent category will be shared biologically by the decedent and sur-
viving spouse. Children from a prior marriage are more likely to be older
and will need support, if at all, for a shorter period of time and thus
would invade less of the corpus of the spousal contribution to the trust.
328. See infra notes 353-54 and accompanying text.
329. This result is supported in part by the public opinion studies where answers posited a
spontaneous support obligation for children on the surviving spouse. See supra notes 249-51
and accompanying text.
330. See supra notes 302-13 and accompanying text.
331. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
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Finally, by having the children's interest in the property of the first
parent vested and recognized at the death of the decedent rather than
after the intergenerational transfer when the surviving parent dies, pro-
tected inheritance would safeguard the expectations of the first decedent
parent 332 that the children would inherit the property. With the multiple
marriage and divorce syndrome experienced by an increasing number of
American families, the surviving parent who remarries may jeopardize
the children's access to the assets of the first spouse because the second
spouse is entitled to an elective share of the assets of that surviving par-
ent if the parent predeceases the second spouse.333 With protected inher-
itance for children, however, this would not happen because the
children's share of the assets would not be part of the estate available to
the second spouse.
(2) Exceptions
The testator can, by the terms of the will, prevent the statutory pro-
tected inheritance from becoming operative. If the testator has provided
for all children in the will such that they would receive the same or
greater protection as under the proposal, the requirement would be satis-
fied. Also, if the testator has provided for all children by means other
than estate assets so that the children would receive their equivalent
share by these nonestate means, the proposal would be satisfied.
For example, life insurance policies in which the benefits payable to
the children equal the protected share of the estate assets would satisfy
the requirements. Pension plans in which the payout to the children
equals the protected share would satisfy the proposed plan. Joint tenan-
cies with children, joint bank accounts, Totten Trust accounts, and other
nonestate assets of which children are the beneficiaries also would satisfy
the requirements of the proposal. When the children are the beneficiaries
of these non-probate assets, the assets would not be includable in calcu-
lating the value of the estate; however, they would satisfy payment of the
protected share for children. When extrafamilial devisees are the benefi-
ciaries of these assets, however, they would be includable in the dece-
dent's estate.
The composition of the estate from which a protected share would
be given to children should be defined. While several commentators cor-
rectly criticize the ability of testators effectively to denude their estates by
332. See supra note 202 and accompanying text.
333. Admittedly this result can be avoided by a prenuptial agreement whereby the second
spouse waives the elective share; but this is a sophisticated legal route that most Americans are
not likely to take.
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PROTECTED INHERITANCE
revocable inter vivos transfers,334 a balance must be set between the
"heads" interests and the "tails" interests. In this regard, it is important
not to lose sight of what inheritance is: the right to share in the assets
owned by the decedent at death, not to share in every asset ever owned
by the decedent during life.
An intentional plan to strip the estate of major -assets at death in
order to defeat and avoid the purpose of the proposed statute would not
be condoned. The right of the owner to make inter vivos transfers of
assets and deprive himself of the use and benefit of them, however,
should be part of the protected right of ownership. Indeed, one might
argue that if the testator can part with assets and fulfill obligations of
support owed to spouse and family while alive, it would be inappropriate
for a potential future owner to be able to restrict the full exercise of own-
ership by the present owner.335
In other words, if the testator irrevocably transferred any asset
while alive such that the testator was deprived of dominion and control
over and use and enjoyment of it, the asset would be excluded from cal-
culation of the estate subject to the protected share for children. If the
testator lived without the asset the children should have no right to claim
it.336 Indeed, to minimize the burden on the courts of the unpleasant
familial surprise that testamentary dispositions of this sort may cause,
the testator should be encouraged to make nonfamilial inter vivos disposi-
tions. The testator, not the courts, thus would bear the brunt of that
decision.337
334. See, ag., Cahn, supra note 15; Haskell, supra note 3; Rein, supra note 13; Samuel,
Shaw & Spaht, supra note 22.
335. It would seem inappropriate, for example, for a child to sue a parent who lost money
in the stock market in October 1987 because the family assets had been depleted. The case of
In re Totten, 179 N.Y. 112, 71 N.E. 748 (1904), is instructive because the court held the trust
beneficiary was entitled to whatever monies were in the bank account when the owner of the
account died and his interest could be realized, but not to whatever monies had been in the
account during its existence, because the owner of the account could do whatever she wanted
with the account, including closing it out, while she was alive. Id. at 124-26, 71 N.E. at 752.
336. It is not so clear, however, whether to include in the estate those assets over which
the owner had divested himself of dominion and control, but had continued to enjoy. See, e.g.,
Gruen v. Gruen, 68 N.Y.2d 48, 496 N.E.2d 869, 505 N.Y.S.2d 849 (1986).
At least one commentator has concluded, consonant with the federal tax laws, that they
should be includable in the estate. Cahn, supra note 15, at 152.
337. This assumes that all the precautions emphasizing the seriousness and finality of an
irrevocable inter vivos transfer are operative to prevent impulsive and regrettable dispositions.
If the donor is unalterably disposed to confer property on a nonfamily member, then perhaps
the donor, and not the courts, should deal with the familial displeasure.
This proposal does not totally eliminate judicial involvement if displeased members of the
family challenge the competency of the donor to make the inter vivos transfer to a nonfamily
member, but it assumes the number of cases of this nature would be fewer than those of dis-
July 1990] . 1259
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
(3) Disinheritance
Just as freedom of testation should not be an absolute right, the
right to inherit also should bow to overriding societal concerns. There
are some limited circumstances in which protected inheritance would be
inappropriate. "Worthless" is a relative and subjective term. A child
that one family would like to disown might be welcomed with open arms
into another family. There are, however, societal norms or expectations
that are held generally and to which most individuals are capable of
conforming.
Though the thesis of this Article is that all children should be pro-
tected from disinheritance, there should be recognized objective stan-
dards for disinheritance in those cases that truly merit it.338 Louisiana,
for example, now has twelve statutory bases for disinherison. 339 Adop-
gruntled family members challenging the nonfamily devisee after the will becomes operative
and the decedent is not there to "take the heat"-at least not heat from this source!
338. See, e.g., W. McGOVERN, S. KURTZ & J. REIN, supra note 8, at 88 (suggesting that
"[p]erhaps the law should allow a parent to disinherit a child only for certain misconduct" and
citing LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 1621 (West 1987), which lists the 12 approved causes of
disinherison in Louisiana).
339. "Disinherison" in the civil law is "the act of depriving a forced heir of the inheritance
which the law gives him." "Disinheritance" is, on the other hand, "the act by which the
owner of an estate deprives a person, who would otherwise be his heir, of the right to inherit
it." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, 421 (5th ed. 1979). The 12 specified reasons for disinherison
in Louisiana are the only reasons legally recognized. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1620 (West
1987). They must be specifically set forth in the will, id. art. 1624, and are as follows:
1. If the child has raised his or her hand to strike the parent, or if he or she has
actually struck the parent; but a mere threat is not sufficient.
2. If the child has been guilty, towards a parent, of cruelty, of a crime or grievous
injury.
3. If the child has attempted to take the life of either parent.
4. If the child has accused a parent of any capital crime, except, however, that of
high treason.
5. If the child has refused sustenance to a parent, having means to afford it.
6. If the child has neglected to take care of a parent become insane.
7. If the child refused to ransom them, when detained in captivity.
8. If the child used any act of violence or coercion to hinder a parent from making a
will.
9. If the child has refused to become security for a parent, having the means, in
order to take him out of prison.
10. If the son or daughter, being a minor, marries without the consent of his or her
parents.
11. If the child has been convicted of a felony for which the law provides that the
punishment could be life imprisonment or death.
12. If the child has known how to contact the parent, but has failed without just
cause to communicate with the parent for a period of two years after attaining the
age of majority, except when the child is on active duty in any of the military forces
of the United States.
Id. art. 1621.
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tion of statutory guidelines by other states would guarantee that the ba-
ses for disinheritance conform to societal norms, are known and accepted
by the general public, and are objective. Such guidelines would prevent
disinheritance from being a personal, subjective, behavior-modification
weapon of parents.34° In those instances where the child could not be
disinherited by law but has exhibited behavior that seriously questions
the wisdom of giving the child control over the inheritance, there are
other avenues open to the objective and genuinely concernied parent.341
(4) Applicability: The Small Estate
Popular opinion, as gleaned from several empirical studies, would
have small estates given over almost entirely to the surviving spouse by
operation of law.342 This generally assumes the postponement of the
children's inheritance rather than their outright disinheritance. 343 It also
assumes that the surviving spouse is the natural parent of the children.
The studies have shown a public preference for separate allocation of
assets between surviving spouse and children when the surviving spouse
is not the natural parent of the children,344 and also when there are adult
children. 345
The problem with inheritance, according to the public, is not tension
between the "heads" and "tails" sides of inheritance, but rather the satis-
faction of competing needs when the resources are insufficient to meet
the expectations of both the surviving spouse and the children.3 46 When
340. The standards proposed here would be limited to those acts that are so heinous and
repugnant to society that other laws are in most instances already on the books to forbid them:
murder of a parent-testator unprovoked physical assault on a parent-testator; knowingly and
intentionally making parent-testat6r a ward of the state when the child had the means to
support the parent. This last examplemakes the parent an unlikely source of assets at death,
unless the parent's fortunes turn around. But generally these examples involve legitimate state
interests: the prevention of violence or murder and the avoidance of an economic burden on
the state.
On the other hand, whom a child marries, or the lack of contact with a parent for two
years, does not address the (extremely unlikely) possibility that the child is right and the par-
ent wrong about the marriage, or that the parent did something that deserved no contact for
two years. These more subjective criteria should be avoided because they give too much con-
trol to the parent without any safeguard or objective determination that the parent is right.
341. The establishment of a protective or spendthrift trust for that child's share of the
estate is one example.
342. See, e.g., supra notes 195-96, 201, 206-09 and accompanying text.
343. See supra notes 196-202 and accompanying text.
344. See, eg., supra notes 230-39 and accompanying text.
345. See, eg., supra notes 203-04, 208-09 and accompanying text.
346. The five-state 1977 telephone survey suggested that when the tension was between a
surviving spouse and adult children, the surviving spouse should win. See supra notes 227-29
and accompanying text. Even there, however, the authors found a smaller percentage distrib-
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the estate is small, the majority of the public would prefer to see the
entire estate go to the surviving spouse. While there are those who quite
appropriately challenge the wisdom of this, 347 perhaps the more relevant
question is what is meant by a "small estate."
There are many assets that families acquire that because of the state
of the title of ownership, would not be part of the decedent's estate.
Families in which the only substantial asset is the family home, for exam-
ple, would in many instances be exempt from the operation of the pro-
tected inheritance requirement. This is because many jurisdictions
recognize a special type of ownership between husband and wife, the ten-
ancy by the entirety, which passes sole title to the surviving spouse upon
the death of the first spouse by operation of law. The house, or the dece-
dent's interest in it, is not considered part of the estate for distribution.
The same result occurs in those jurisdictions in which the family home,
or any real estate, is owned by the husband and wife as joint tenants.
Upon death of one joint tenant, his or her interest passes immediately to
the surviving tenant. Under either of these circumstances, the real prop-
erty would not be part of the decedent's estate and would pass directly to
the surviving spouse. 348
Many Americans have other assets that are not considered part of
the decedent's estate and thus would not be subject to the protective in-
heritance requirements. Such assets include life insurance policies, Social
Security survivor benefits, pension plan beneficiaries, Totten Trust bank
accounts, and joint bank accounts. If these types of assets made up the
uting the entire estate to the spouse when there were adult children (51.6%) than when there
were only minor children (58.3%).
347. See, e.g., Haskell, supra note 3, at 521 (Professor Haskell's response that the compe-
tency of the surviving spouse should be considered, and if he or she is incompetent this would
justify "denying to the decedent the power to leave his entire estate to the spouse").
348. In those cases in which the property was held in the name of the decedent only, the
house would be part of the decedent's estate. Here, however, where there is a surviving spouse
and children, the interest of the children would vest at the decedent's death, and they would
become co-owners with the spouse, but they would not be able to force a partition or otherwise
interrupt the peaceful enjoyment of the property by the survivor spouse. Continued use and
enjoyment of the house by the spouse and minor children would be consistent with the obliga-
tion to support the minor children.
A difficulty might arise at the point when the children were not living at home or wanted
to continue their education full time but there were not enough funds available without a sale
of the home. Then there would be a tension between the need of the surviving spouse to have
an affordable place to live and the dependent children in continuing their education full time, a
tension that could have been avoided by a survivorship form of concurrent ownership between
husband and wife.
If the survivor spouse sells the home, the interest of the children would be transformed
into an equivalent interest in either the new property acquired or the money realized from the
sale.
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bulk or all of the family assets in a given estate, though substantial assets
to the surviving spouse or children if they were the-named beneficiaries,
they would not be part of the decedent's estate and thus not subject to
protected inheritance.
If the beneficiaries were other than spouse and children and the es-
tate had few if any assets, these assets would be includable in the dece-
dent's estate. While the testator is free to make truly irrevocable inter
vivos transfers, he cannot denude the estate by employing these nonpro-
bate mechanisms.
In modem terms of wealth, the types of estates that would be subject
to protected inheritance are probably those estates that would not be
considered small estates. 349 This proposal is thus consistent with the sen-
timent expressed in the empirical studies.
The fact that every estate in America would not be affected by this
proposal is no reason not to implement it for those estates that would be
affected-those estates in which the testator is not living up to his or her
family obligations. It is not possible to document precisely how many
estates would be affected because the present lack of an available remedy
provides no forum for these cases and therefore no reliable means to
measure the extent of the problem. 350
B. The Family Response and Protected Inheritance
When parents die, the dependent status of their minor children does
not also die. While the parent no longer is there to provide for the child
as he was expected to be while alive, the needs of the child remain.
When the parent has the means to continue the support of the child, the
state should protect the child by requiring some of the assets to be set
aside for the child. For if the state does not enforce this protection, the
state itself may have to support the child. This is a practical, economic
consequence of resolving the tension between the parent-child bond and
testamentary freedom in favor of the latter. Other reasons support legis-
lative enactment of protected inheritance.
(1) Consanguinity351
Consanguinity is one basis for protected inheritance as proposed
herein. One commentator earlier acknowledged the pivotal role consan-
guinity plays in the rationale for such a proposal:
349. See, eg., supra notes 211-20 and accompanying text.
350. See supra note 15.
351. Kinship; blood relationship; the connection or relation of persons descended from the
same stock or common ancestor. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 275 (5th ed. 1979).
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To begin with, I do not believe that need should necessarily be the
exclusive criterion for the determination of the claims of spouse or
children. I believe that consanguinity may be justification in and of
itself for claim to some portion of the property of the decedent. I
would not attempt to offer a reasoned justification for this position,
since it involves considerations which I do not believe have their roots
in reason. I believe, however, that it is a view widely held, albeit inade-
quately articulated.352
In a more cosmic context, consanguinity has been identified as a
fundamental familial function: "a strong sense of loyalty to ancestors,
living blood relatives and future descendants, and a preoccupation with
the continuation of the bloodline. '3 53 This function is just as vital today
as it was centuries ago. While a return to past fixations on bloodlines and
duty is not being suggested, "a lineage mentality for today, when we are
faced with many threats to the survival of the species and, indeed, to life
on the planet, could embrace not only our own children, and their chil-
dren's children, but also the children and descendants of other inhabit-
ants of the earth. ' 354
Procreation, at once one of the most selfish and selfless phenom-
ena,355 creates bonds that often transcend the grave. Honoring the dead
is a central part of several ancient cultures and the responsibility falls to
one related by blood to the deceased. 356 In modem societies, children
often donate considerable sums of money to educational, cultural, and
healing institutions for buildings named to honor their parents. The pas-
sionate surge of emotions and primitive protective instincts kindled in the
hearts and minds of rational, socialized adults when there is a perception
of danger or threat to their children of any age is witness to the power of
Consanguinity is also an integral factor in forced heirship, but perhaps more to identify who
should receive the assets than to explain why these individuals should receive them.
352. Haskell, supra note 3, at 525.
353. M. GLENDON, supra note 8, at 239.
354. Id. at 239-40. Samuel, Shaw & Spaht agree, stating:
At a time when man is faced with threats to the survival of the species and to life on
this planet, it is once again time to assume responsibility for future generations....
To acquire this mentality, individuals need to be supported and nourished "first, in
small family, work and political societies." Hence, the importance of encouraging
family bonding is demonstrated.
Samuel, Shaw & Spaht, supra note 22, at 593 (footnotes omitted). Dean Hafen notes: "By its
nature, the familistic entity has a greater capacity to encourage the kind of human caring and
sense of mutual responsibility for which the contemporary world cries out-even though such
sensitivities cannot always be legally required or enforced." Hafen, supra note 1, at 914.
355. Selfish in that reproduction is the ultimate satisfaction of the ego's search for immor-
tality; selfless in that, for decades to come after the birth of a child, most parents sacrifice
personal benefits for the benefit of the child.
356. See, e.g., H. MAINE, supra note 1, at 182-90 ("Hindoo" and Roman cultures); F.
POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 25, at 257-58.
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the call of blood. 357 Likewise the euphoric emotional swells experienced
by a parent at the milestones of life and accomplishments of their off-
spring are caused in part by the common blood between them, resulting
in shared honor.
Lest one get carried away with the visceral images conjured up by
the call of the blood, this biological, emotional, and unbreakable bond
has been socialized and adapted from ancient times to encompass unre-
lated individuals who have been chosen consciously by the natural family
members to join as members of their family. Adoption statutes give state
and social recognition to this ability of families to create legal ties of
blood line strength and endurance with non-blood-related individuals.35
References to blood line and consanguinity thus also include these legally
created family relationships. Finally, natural children who can establish
their blood connection to the decedent, whether acknowledged in life by
the decedent or not, would receive the benefits of protected inheritance.
Consanguinity does not have intense significance merely at times of
danger, honor, and accomplishment. The sanctity of the parent-child
bond is encouraged and reinforced by the state or society as a whole
because, until the age of majority, parents are expected and required to
provide for all the needs, education, and nurturing of each child they
conceive or adopt.35 9 Living parents, in other words, are responsible for
their minor children because minor children cannot survive in the world
on their own.
(2) Responsibility
The parental role in societal perpetuation requires more than mere
physical survival of the children. With no education, training, morality,
ethics, culture, and socialization, the survivors would be humans, but
incapable of continuing the advancement of society. Historically, it has
been parents who were charged with the responsibility to provide for the
child's needs; even today it is at best a shared responsibility with the
state.360
357. In an article on dreams, the author reported: "The distinguishing trait of all night-
mares is that the dreamer is endangered. Parents are the exception: they dream their babies
are in trouble." Begley, The Stuff That Dreams Are Made Of NEWSWEEK, Aug. 14, 1989, at
41, 43.
358. See, ag., Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 481 U.S. 816, 841 n.51 (1977)
("[a]doption, for example, is recognized as the legal equivalent of biological parenthood" (re-
ferring to N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 110 (McKinney 1977))).
359. See supra notes 298-300.
360. "Parents committed to a familistic tradition," according to Dean Hafen, "accept the
normative obligation to 'nourish and educate' children," which cannot be done effectively with
"state intervention in ongoing family relationships." Hafen, supra note 1, at 911. Professor
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Bearing children who truly did not ask to be born is a commitment
to give them the best that one can, even at personal sacrifice. Indeed, if it
were not for all the positive, rewarding, and wonderful aspects of parent-
ing, parenthood could be described as permanent reparation for the in-
dulgence of self-perpetuation.
The purpose of protected inheritance is recognition and reaffirma-
tion of familial choices made and serious obligations undertaken by the
decision to have children. 361 By requiring some part of the assets of the
parent to be passed on to the child, society recognizes and honors that
relationship, even if those parents who would disinherit children do not.
This would more realistically protect minor and dependent children,
children in multi-marriage relationships, and child victims of bitter di-
vorces against irresponsible testators.362 Family interests thus are pro-
tected, and testators still will have their testamentary freedom.
Protected inheritance would bring home the solemnity of the deci-
sion to have children by defining the scope of the parental obligation to
the beings created as extending beyond the grave when the parent has left
behind the means to fulfill that obligation. Protected inheritance requires
no more of the parent at death than what the parent has undertaken to
do for the child in life.
(3) On Behalf of Adult Emancipated Children
While there are compelling reasons for protected inheritance for mi-
nor children, many feel that there is no legitimate reason to protect adult
children. 363 This Article suggests that there are reasons to include adult,
independent children under the proposed protections.
Most people are opposed to guaranteeing an inheritance to an adult
if the adult has independently made a fortune or is deemed to be worth-
less. One can assume that the adult child who has made an independent
fortune has indeed done those very things that the parent instilled in the
Teitelbaum, on the other hand, sees the interaction of parent and state as more cooperative.
Teitelbaum, supra note 29, at 813-18. See also supra note 302.
361. "Moreover, contemporary pluralism does not require that, in the name of protecting
our cultural heterogeneity, we reject the idea that the obligations of marital partners and par-
ents carry serious moral overtones." Hafen, supra note 1, at 906.
362. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
363. However, as the empirical studies show, this is not a universal sentiment: in the 1958
Nebraska study, 63.4% felt parents should not be allowed to disinherit adult children. See
supra note 192 and accompanying text. In the 1976 Illinois study, fewer interviewees would
leave the entire estate to the surviving spouse when there were adult children (41.2%) than
when there were minor children (53.3%). See supra note 242 and accompanying text. The
same was true in the 1977, five-state telephone survey. See supra notes 208-09 and accompany-
ing text.
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child during minority and is a credit to the parent. -It .then would be
illogical to reward the achievements of the adult child by denying an
inheritance that would be guaranteed to those children who did not
achieve as much. This would be negative reinforcement of the qualities
and goals instilled in the child since birth.
While it could be argued that adult children have less of a need due
to resources and assets earned on their own, need is not the only consid-
eration here; consanguinity is also relevant. Furthermore, there is always
the consideration that the child may have less ability to earn because of
decisions made by the parent while the parent was legally responsible for
the welfare and education of the child.364 For example, if the parent
forced the child into a mold totally unsuited to the child but fitting the
parent's image of who the child should be, the parent may be responsible
for the child's current, less than optimal status. If because of a refusal to
invest in the child's training and education or physical, mental, or emo-
tional well-being, the child is less capable of earning than she would be
otherwise, the parent may be responsible for the child's status. These
were decisions over which the child had no influence.
a. The Professor Henry Higgins Complex
Another reason that people may be reluctant to protect adult chil-
dren is that many people, consciously or subconsciously, want to use the
ability to disinherit a child to force the child to do what they want, when
they want, and the way they want. Actually, unmarried aunts and uncles
without children of their own may abuse this as much as, if not more
than, parents; but the ability to disinherit is unquestionably a way for the
testator to coerce someone who expects to be left something to do what
the testator wants. The relevant question here, however, is whether it
should be.
The ego and love of self that motivate some individuals to reproduce
may be a useful artifice of Nature to encourage procreation, but neither is
a valid or sufficient reason to have children nor a viable standard by
which to raise them. If the nurturing or nesting instinct is the dominant
procreative urge, the adjustment to the true parental role may be less
startling, but will be required nevertheless. Whatever the reasons for
having children, parents must accept that children are independent
human beings with their own goals, aspirations, standards, preferences,
talents, predilections, weaknesses, characters, and personalities.
364. See, eg., Laufer, supra note 3, at 310.
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Parents should not force children to be what they want them to
be, or do what they want them to do. The fact that children are in-
dependent human beings and not merely extensions of their parents,
however, does not diminish either parental responsibility for the child or
the familial experiences that forge and nurture the parent-child bond.
Society should not condone parental abandonment by permitting subjec-
tive disinheritance. 365
b. Child Contributions
If we look at the level of control that a parent rightfully exercises
over a child with state approval and expectation, one could argue that a
child has "earned" the right to inherit by having to do what the parent
wanted during minority, and even beyond. Because the child did not ask
to be born, and the parents consciously chose to have the child, the par-
ents are responsible for making decisions for the child that the child can-
not make herself. This parental role continues even when the child is
able to know what she wants but cannot make the separate judgment of
what is best for herself and others in the family. In many instances, daily
decisions affecting all children, such as schools attended, extracurricular
activities pursued, sports learned, music lessons taken, camps attended,
clothes purchased and worn, friends cultivated, books read, television
programs viewed, social events missed as well as attended, courses of
medical and emotional treatment pursued or foregone, and lineal and
lateral family members cultivated or ignored, are all determined by the
parents. 3
66
Family decisions such as moving to a new neighborhood, city, or
state usually are based on parental objectives such as a better job oppor-
tunity or a perceived improved style of living. Nevertheless, these deci-
sions take an even greater toll on the child's existing friendships,
neighborhood, and school relationships. The decision whether to have
more children has a clear effect on existing children, and their preference
is rarely determinative, nor should it be.
365. This is not to say that parents are completely responsible for how their children turn
out. Of course, it is possible that the decedent was the most sensitive, loving, caring, giving,
selfless parent in the world and still the children developed into miserable human beings. Nev-
ertheless, the child is part of the decedent's family. Indeed the rotter of a child may not be to
blame either. It is possible that biological or chemical imbalances in the child are creating the
problem.
366. To varying degrees the child may be permitted some input into these decisions, and
others may have external forces being the final determinant; but in the main, the parent is
expected to exercise final authority in these decisions.
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The parent is not "wrong" in exercising the decisive role in these
choices; that is the role of the parent. 367 In many instances, the child is
not capable of making the choice, nor would it be appropriate for the
child to do so. What these examples show is that the child's role does
permit the child to "earn" her way in the family by doing those things
she would prefer not to do, or not doing those things she would prefer to
do.
These non-choices, which may result in unhappiness and disap-
pointments for the child, are the contributions that the child makes to
the family assets. While the child has no choice in making the contribu-
tion, "going along" benefits the family unit and permits each member to
play out their role, thus earning the child the right to partake in the
family assets.
Conclusion
Parents have an obligation to their children that continues even after
death. This obligation arises from the parent-child bond that the parents
initiated and created and continues whether support is actually needed,
as in the case of minor children or emancipated but financially dependent
children, or not needed; and from the commemoration of the commit-
ment the parents made to the unborn child when they decided to have a
child.
This thesis is not born out of a resurgent, romantic view of the fam-
ily or a paean to traditionalist familial definitions, limitations, or values.
The continued narrow definition of family is neither realistic, desirable,
or necessary for the obligation of protected inheritance to endure after
death. Rather, this Article's proposal is a call to responsibility and ac-
countability for actions taken by individuals, whether within a familial
context or not, that have directly affected the children. If one has chil-
dren and also the financial means to support them, parental obligations
should be recognized and enforced, even at death.
This is not a revolutionary proposal; in some ways it is older than
civilization. It is not a reactionary proposal; some variant of this propo-
sal, in the form of forced heirship, is practiced in many modern societies
throughout the world. The modern phenomena of multiple marriages
and divorces, statutory protections for some family members but not
others, and. limited resources of parents of multiple families tip the bal-
ance in favor of protected inheritance for children at the expense of the
romantic theory of testamentary freedom, which is already besieged by
367. See, eg., Teitelbaum, supra note 29, at 823-24.
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prior public policy restrictions. It is time for the state legislatures to
champion the "tails" side of the two-sided coin of inheritance.
